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ABSTRACT. Building on insights of Jovanovic (1982) and subsequent authors, we
develop a comprehensive theory of optimal timing of decisions based around con-
tinuation value functions and operators that act on them. Optimality results are
provided under general settings, with bounded or unbounded reward functions.
This approach has several intrinsic advantages that we exploit in developing the
theory. One is that continuation value functions are smoother than value functions,
allowing for sharper analysis of optimal policies and more efficient computation.
Another is that, for a range of problems, the continuation value function exists in
a lower dimensional space than the value function, mitigating the curse of dimen-
sionality. In one typical experiment, this reduces the computation time from over
a week to less than three minutes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A large variety of decision making problems involve choosing when to act in the
face of risk and uncertainty. Examples include deciding if or when to accept a
job offer, exit or enter a market, default on a loan, bring a new product to market,
exploit some new technology or business opportunity, or exercise a real or financial
1 Financial support from Australian Research Council Discovery Grant DP120100321 is grate-
fully acknowledged.
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2option. See, for example, McCall (1970), Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Dixit
and Pindyck (1994), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Peskir and Shiryaev (2006), Arellano
(2008), Perla and Tonetti (2014), and Fajgelbaum et al. (2015).
The most general and robust techniques for solving these kinds of problems re-
volve around the theory of dynamic programming. The standard machinery cen-
ters on the Bellman equation, which identifies current value in terms of a trade off
between current rewards and the discounted value of future states. The Bellman
equation is traditionally solved by framing the solution as a fixed point of the Bell-
man operator. Standard references include Bellman (1969) and Stokey et al. (1989).
Applications of these methods to optimal timing include Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Crawford and Shum (2005), Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2012), and Fajgelbaum et al. (2015).
Interestingly, over the past few decades, economists have initiated development of
an alternative method, based around continuation values, that is both essentially
parallel to the traditional method described above and yet significantly different
in certain asymmetric ways (described in detail below).
Perhaps the earliest technically sophisticated analysis based around operations in
continuation value function space is Jovanovic (1982). In an incumbent firm’s exit
decision context, Jovanovic proposes an operator that is a contraction mapping on
the space of bounded continuous functions, and shows that the unique fixed point
of the operator coincides with the value of staying in the industry for the current
period and then behave optimally. Intuitively, this value can be understood as the
continuation value of the firm, since the firm gives up the choice to terminate the
sequential decision process (exit the industry) in the current period.
Other papers in a similar vein include Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), Gomes et al.
(2001), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), Lise (2013), Dunne et al. (2013), Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2013), and Menzio and Trachter (2015). All of the results found
in these papers are tied to particular applications, and many are applied rather
than technical in nature.
3It is not difficult to understand why economists often focus on continuation values
as a function of the state rather than traditional value functions. One is economic
intuition. In a given context it might be more natural or intuitive to frame a de-
cision problem in terms of the continuation values faced by an agent. For exam-
ple, in a job search context, one of the key questions is how the reservation wage,
the wage at which the agent is indifferent between accepting and rejecting an of-
fer, changes with economic environments. Obviously, the continuation value, the
value of rejecting the current offer, has closer connection to the reservation wage
than the value function, the maximum value of accepting and rejecting the offer.
There are, however, deeper reasons why a focus on continuation values can be
highly fruitful. To illustrate, recall that, for a given problem, the value function
provides the value of optimally choosing to either act today or wait, given the cur-
rent environment. The continuation value is the value associated with choosing to
wait today and then reoptimize next period, again taking into account the current
environment. One key asymmetry arising here is that, if one chooses to wait, then
certain aspects of the current environment become irrelevant, and hence need not
be considered as arguments to the continuation value function.
To give one example, consider a potential entrant to a market who must consider
fixed costs of entry, the evolution of prices, their own productivity and so on. In
some settings, certain aspects of the environment will be transitory, while others
are persistent. (For example, in Fajgelbaum et al. (2015), prices and beliefs are
persistent while fixed costs are transitory.) All relevant state components must be
included in the value function, whether persistent or transitory, since all affect the
choice of whether to enter or wait today. On the other hand, purely transitory
components do not affect continuation values, since, in that scenario, the decision
to wait has already been made.
Such asymmetries place the continuation value function in a lower dimensional
space than the value function whenever they exist, thereby mitigating the curse
of dimensionality. This matters from both an analytical and a computational per-
spective. On the analytical side, lower dimensionality can simplify challenging
4problems associated with, say, unbounded reward functions, continuity and differ-
entiability arguments, parametric monotonicity results, etc. On the computational
side, reduction of the state space by even one dimension can radically increase
computational speed. For example, while solving a well known version of the job
search model in section 5.1, the continuation value based approach takes only 171
seconds to compute the optimal policy to a given level of precision, as opposed to
more than 7 days for the traditional value function based approach.
One might imagine that this difference in dimensionality between the two ap-
proaches could, in some circumstances, work in the other direction, with the value
function existing in a strictly lower dimensional space than the continuation value
function. In fact this is not possible. As will be clear from the discussion below, for
any decision problem in the broad class that we consider, the dimensionality of the
value function is always at least as large.
Another asymmetry between value functions and continuation value functions is
that the latter are typically smoother. For example, in a job search problem, the
value function is usually kinked at the reservation wage. However, the continua-
tion value function can be smooth. More generally, continuation value functions
are lent smoothness by stochastic transitions, since integration is a smoothing op-
eration. Like lower dimensionality, increased smoothness helps on both the ana-
lytical and the computational side. On the computational side, smoother functions
are easier to approximate. On the analytical side, greater smoothness lends itself
to sharper results based on derivatives, as elaborated on below.
To summarize the discussion above, economists have pioneered the continuation
value function based approach to optimal timing of decisions. This has been driven
by researchers correctly surmising that such an approach will yield tighter intu-
ition and sharper analysis than the traditional approach in many modeling prob-
lems. However, all of the analysis to date has been in the context of specific, in-
dividual applications. This fosters unnecessary replication, inhibits applied re-
searchers seeking off-the-shelf results, and also hides deeper advantages.
5In this paper we undertake a systematic study of optimal timing of decisions based
around continuation value functions and the operators that act on them. The
theory we develop accommodates both bounded rewards and the kinds of un-
bounded rewards routinely encountered in modeling economic decisions.2 In fact,
within the context of optimal timing, the assumptions placed on the primitives in
the theory we develop are weaker than those found in existing work framed in
terms of the traditional approach to dynamic programming, as discussed below.
We also exploit the asymmetries between traditional and continuation value func-
tion based approaches to provide a detailed set of continuity, monotonicity and dif-
ferentiability results. For example, we use the relative smoothness of the continua-
tion value function to state conditions under which so-called “threshold policies”
(i.e., policies where action occurs whenever a reservation threshold is crossed) are
continuously differentiable with respect to features of the economic environment,
as well as to derive expressions for the derivative.
Since we explicitly treat unbounded problems, our work also contributes to on-
going research on dynamic programming with unbounded rewards. One general
approach tackles unbounded rewards via the weighted supremum norm. The un-
derlying idea is to introduce a weighted norm in a certain space of candidate func-
tions, and then establish the contraction property for the relevant operator. This
theory was pioneered by Boyd (1990) and has been used in numerous other studies
of unbounded dynamic programming. Examples include Becker and Boyd (1997),
Alvarez and Stokey (1998), Dura´n (2000, 2003) and Le Van and Vailakis (2005).
Another line of research treats unboundedness via the local contraction approach,
which constructs a local contraction based on a suitable sequence of increasing
2 For example, many applications include Markov state processes (possibly with unit roots),
driving the state space and various common reward functions (e.g., CRRA, CARA and log re-
turns) unbounded (see, e.g, Low et al. (2010), Bagger et al. (2014), Kellogg (2014)). Moreover, many
search-theoretic studies model agent’s learning behavior (see, e.g., Burdett and Vishwanath (1988),
Mitchell (2000), Crawford and Shum (2005), Nagypa´l (2007), Timoshenko (2015)). To have favorable
prior-posterior structure (e.g., both follow normal distributions), unbounded state spaces and re-
wards are usually required. We show that most of these problems can be handled without difficulty.
6compact subsets. See, e.g., Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero (2003), Rinco´n-
Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero (2009), Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010)
and Matkowski and Nowak (2011). One motivation of this line of work is to deal
with dynamic programming problems that are unbounded both above and below.
So far, existing theories of unbounded dynamic programming have been confined
to optimal growth problems. Rather less attention, however, has been paid to the
study of optimal timing of decisions. Indeed, applied studies of unbounded prob-
lems in this field still rely on theorem 9.12 of Stokey et al. (1989) (see, e.g., Poschke
(2010), Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)). Since the assumptions of this theo-
rem are not based on model primitives, it is hard to verify in applications. Even if
they are applicable to some specialized setups, the contraction mapping structure
is unavailable. A recent study of unbounded problem via contraction mapping
is Kellogg (2014). However, he focuses on a highly specialized decision problem
with linear rewards. Since there is no general unbounded dynamic programming
theory in this field, we attempt to fill this gap.
Notably, the local contraction approach exploits the underlying structure of the
technological correspondence related to the state process, which, in optimal growth
models, provides natural bounds on the growth rate of the state process, thus
a suitable selection of a sequence of compact subsets to construct local contrac-
tions. However, such structures are missing in most sequential decision settings
we study, making the local contraction approach inapplicable.
In response to that, we come back to the idea of weighted supremum norm, which
turns out to interact well with the sequential decision structure we explore. To ob-
tain an appropriate weight function, we introduce an innovative idea centered on
dominating the future transitions of the reward functions, which renders the clas-
sical weighted supremum norm theory of Boyd (1990) as a special case, and leads
to simple sufficient conditions that are straightforward to check in applications.
The intuitions of our theory are twofold. First, when the underlying state process
is mean-reverting, the effect of initial conditions tends to die out as time iterates
forward, making the conditional expectations of the reward functions flatter than
7the original rewards. Second, in a wide range of applications, a subset of states are
conditionally independent of the future states, so the conditional expectation of
the payoff functions is actually defined on a space that is lower dimensional than
the state space.3 In each scenario, finding an appropriate weight function becomes
an easier job.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the method and provides
the basic optimality results. Section 3 discusses the properties of the continuation
value function, such as monotonicity and differentiability. Section 4 explores the
connections between the continuation value and the optimal policy. Section 5 pro-
vides a list of economic applications and compares the computational efficiency
of the continuation value approach and traditional approach. Section 6 provides
extensions and section 7 concludes. Proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2. OPTIMALITY RESULTS
This section studies the optimality results. Prior to this task, we introduce some
mathematical techniques used in this paper.
2.1. Preliminaries. For real numbers a and b let a ∨ b := max{a, b}. If f and g
are functions, then ( f ∨ g)(x) := f (x) ∨ g(x). If (Z,Z ) is a measurable space,
then bZ is the set of Z -measurable bounded functions from Z to R, with norm
‖ f ‖ := supz∈Z | f (z)|. Given a function κ : Z → [1,∞), the κ-weighted supremum
norm of f : Z→ R is
‖ f ‖κ := ‖ f /κ‖ = sup
z∈Z
| f (z)|
κ(z)
.
If ‖ f ‖κ < ∞, we say that f is κ-bounded. The symbol bκZ will denote the set of
all functions from Z to R that are both Z -measurable and κ-bounded. The pair
(bκZ, ‖ · ‖κ) forms a Banach space (see e.g., Boyd (1990), page 331).
A stochastic kernel P on (Z,Z ) is a map P : Z×Z → [0, 1] such that z 7→ P(z, B) is
Z -measurable for each B ∈ Z and B 7→ P(z, B) is a probability measure for each
3 Technically, this also accounts for the lower dimensionality of the continuation value function
than the value function, as documented above. Section 4 provides a detailed discussion.
8z ∈ Z. We understand P(z, B) as the probability of a state transition from z ∈ Z to
B ∈ Z in one step. Throughout, we let N := {1, 2, . . .} and N0 := {0} ∪N. For
all n ∈ N, Pn(z, B) := ∫ P(z′, B)Pn−1(z, dz′) is the probability of a state transition
from z to B ∈ Z in n steps. Given a Z -measurable function h : Z→ R, let
(Pnh)(z) :=: E zh(Zn) :=
∫
h(z′)Pn(z, dz′) for all n ∈ N0,
where (P0h)(z) :=: E zh(Z0) := h(z). When Z is a Borel subset of Rm, a stochastic
density kernel (or density kernel) on Z is a measurable map f : Z× Z → R+ such
that
∫
Z f (z
′|z)dz′ = 1 for all z ∈ Z. We say that the stochastic kernel P has a density
representation if there exists a density kernel f such that
P(z, B) =
∫
B
f (z′|z)dz′ for all z ∈ Z and B ∈ Z .
2.2. Set Up. Let (Zn)n≥0 be a time-homogeneous Markov process defined on prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P) and taking values in measurable space (Z,Z ). Let P denote
the corresponding stochastic kernel. Let {Fn}n≥0 be a filtration contained in F
such that (Zn)n≥0 is adapted to {Fn}n≥0. Let Pz indicate probability conditioned
on Z0 = z, while E z is expectation conditioned on the same event. In proofs we
take (Ω,F ) to be the canonical sequence space, so that Ω = ×∞n=0Z and F is the
product σ-algebra generated by Z .4
A random variable τ taking values in N0 is called a (finite) stopping time with re-
spect to the filtration {Fn}n≥0 if P{τ < ∞} = 1 and {τ ≤ n} ∈ Fn for all n ≥ 0.
Below, τ = n has the interpretation of choosing to act at time n. LetM denote the
set of all stopping times on Ω with respect to the filtration {Fn}n≥0.
Let r : Z → R and c : Z → R be measurable functions, referred to below as the
exit payoff and flow continuation payoff, respectively. Consider a decision problem
where, at each time t ≥ 0, an agent observes Zt and chooses between stopping (e.g.,
accepting a job, exiting a market, exercising an option) and continuing to the next
stage. Stopping generates final payoff r(Zt). Continuing involves a continuation
4 For the formal construction of Pz on (Ω,F ) given P and z ∈ Z see theorem 3.4.1 of Meyn and
Tweedie (2012) or section 8.2 of Stokey et al. (1989).
9payoff c(Zt) and transition to the next period, where the agent observes Zt+1 and
the process repeats. Future payoffs are discounted at rate β ∈ (0, 1).
Let v∗ be the value function, which is defined at z ∈ Z by
v∗(z) := sup
τ∈M
E z
{
τ−1
∑
t=0
βtc(Zt) + βτr(Zτ)
}
. (1)
A stopping time τ ∈M is called an optimal stopping time if it attains the supremum
in (1). A policy is a map σ from Z to {0, 1}, with 0 indicating the decision to continue
and 1 indicating the decision to stop. A policy σ is called an optimal policy if τ∗
defined by τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 | σ(Zt) = 1} is an optimal stopping time.
To guarantee existence of the value function and related properties without insist-
ing that payoff functions are bounded, we adopt the next assumption:
Assumption 2.1. There exist a Z -measurable function g : Z → R+ and constants
n ∈ N0, m, d ∈ R+ such that βm < 1, and, for all z ∈ Z,
max
{∫
|r(z′)|Pn(z, dz′),
∫
|c(z′)|Pn(z, dz′)
}
≤ g(z) (2)
and ∫
g(z′)P(z, dz′) ≤ mg(z) + d. (3)
Note that by definition, condition (2) reduces to |r| ∨ |c| ≤ g when n = 0. The
interpretation of assumption 2.1 is that both E z|r(Zn)| and E z|c(Zn)| are small
relative to some function g such that E zg(Zt) does not grow too quickly. Slow
growth in E zg(Zt) is imposed by (3), which can be understood as a geometric
drift condition (see, e.g., Meyn and Tweedie (2012), chapter 15).
Remark 2.1. To verify assumption 2.1, it suffices to obtain a Z -measurable func-
tion g : Z→ R+, and constants n ∈ N0, m, d ∈ R+ with βm < 1, and a1, a2, a3, a4 ∈
R+ such that
∫ |r(z′)|Pn(z, dz′) ≤ a1g(z) + a2, ∫ |c(z′)|Pn(z, dz′) ≤ a3g(z) + a4
and (3) holds. We use this fact in the applications below.
Remark 2.2. One can show that if assumption 2.1 holds for some n, it must hold
for all n′ ∈ N0 such that n′ > n. Hence, to satisfy assumption 2.1, it suffices to
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find a measurable map g and constants n1, n2 ∈ N0, m, d ∈ R+ with βm < 1 such
that
∫ |r(z′)|Pn1(z, dz′) ≤ g(z), ∫ |c(z′)|Pn2(z, dz′) ≤ g(z) and (3) holds. One can
combine this result with remark 2.1 to obtain more general sufficient conditions.
Example 2.1. Consider first an example with bounded rewards. Suppose, as in
McCall (1970), that a worker can either accept a current wage offer wt and work
permanently at that wage, or reject the offer, receive unemployment compensation
c0 > 0 and reconsider next period. Let the current wage offer be a function wt =
w(Zt) of some idiosyncratic or aggregate state process (Zt)t≥0. The exit payoff is
r(z) = u(w(z))/(1− β), where u is a utility function and β < 1 is the discount
factor. The flow continuation payoff is c ≡ c0. If u is bounded, then we can set
g(z) ≡ ‖r‖ ∨ c0, and assumption 2.1 is satisfied with n := 0, m := 1 and d := 0.
Example 2.2. Consider now Markov state dynamics in a job search framework (see,
e.g., Lucas and Prescott (1974), Jovanovic (1987), Bull and Jovanovic (1988), Gomes
et al. (2001), Cooper et al. (2007), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009), Robin (2011), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), Bagger et al.
(2014)). Consider the same setting as example 2.1, with state process
Zt+1 = ρZt + b + εt+1, (εt)
IID∼ N(0, σ2). (4)
The state space is Z := R. We consider a typical unbounded problem and provide
its proof in appendix B. Let wt = exp(Zt) and the utility of the agent be defined by
the CRRA form
u(w) =
{
w1−δ
1−δ , if δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1
ln w, if δ = 1
(5)
Case I: δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1. If ρ ∈ (−1, 1), then we can select an n ∈ N0 that satisfies
βe|ρn|ξ < 1, where ξ := |(1 − δ)b| + (1 − δ)2σ2/2. In this case, assumption 2.1
holds for g(z) := eρ
n(1−δ)z + eρn(δ−1)z and m := d := e|ρn|ξ . Indeed, if βeξ < 1, then
assumption 2.1 holds (with n = 0) for all ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
Case II: δ = 1. If β|ρ| < 1, then assumption 2.1 holds with n := 0, g(z) := |z|,
m := |ρ| and d := σ + |b|. Notably, since |ρ| ≥ 1 is not excluded, wages can be
nonstationary provided that they do not grow too fast.
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Remark 2.3. Assumption 2.1 is weaker than the assumptions of existing theory.
Consider the local contraction method of Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero
(2003). The essence is to find a countable increasing sequence of compact subsets,
denoted by {Kj}, such that Z = ∪∞j=1Kj. Let Γ : Z → 2Z be the technological cor-
respondence of the state process (Zt)t≥0 giving the set of feasible actions. To con-
struct local contractions, one need Γ(Kj) ⊂ Kj or Γ(Kj) ⊂ Kj+1 with probability one
for all j ∈ N (see, e.g., theorems 3–4 of Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero
(2003), or assumptions D1–D2 of Matkowski and Nowak (2011)). This assumption
is often violated when (Zt)t≥0 has unbounded supports. In example 2.2, since the
AR(1) state process (4) travels intertemporally through R with positive probabil-
ity, the local contraction method breaks down.
Remark 2.4. The use of n-step transitions in assumption 2.1-(2) has certain ad-
vantages. For example, if (Zt)t≥0 is mean-reverting, as time iterates forward, the
initial effect tends to die out, making the conditional expectations E z|r(Zn)| and
E z|c(Zn)| flatter than the original payoffs. As a result, finding an appropriate g-
function with geometric drift property is much easier. Typically, in Case I of exam-
ple 2.2, if ρ ∈ (−1, 1), without using future transitions (i.e., n = 0 is imposed),5 one
need further assumptions such as βeξ < 1 (see appendix B), which puts nontrivial
restrictions on the key parameters β and δ. Using n-step transitions, however, such
restrictions are completely removed.
Example 2.3. Consider now agent’s learning in a job search framework (see, e.g.,
McCall (1970), Chalkley (1984), Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), Pries and Roger-
son (2005), Nagypa´l (2007), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012)). We follow McCall
(1970) (section IV) and explore how the reservation wage changes in response to
the agent’s expectation of the mean and variance of the (unknown) wage offer
distribution. Each period, the agent observes an offer wt and decides whether to
accept it or remain unemployed. The wage process (wt)t≥0 follows
ln wt = ξ + εt, (εt)t≥0
IID∼ N(0,γε), (6)
5 Indeed, our assumption in this case reduces to the standard weighted supnorm assumption.
See, e.g., section 4 of Boyd (1990), or assumptions 1-4 of Dura´n (2003).
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where ξ is the mean of the wage process, which is not observed by the worker, who
has prior belief ξ ∼ N(µ,γ).6 The worker’s current estimate of the next period
wage distribution is f (w′|µ,γ) = LN(µ,γ+ γε). After observing w′, the belief is
updated, with posterior ξ|w′ ∼ N(µ′,γ′), where
γ′ = (1/γ+ 1/γε)−1 and µ′ = γ′
(
µ/γ+ ln w′/γε
)
. (7)
Let the utility of the worker be defined by (5). If he accepts the offer, the search
process terminates and a utility u(w) is obtained in each future period. Otherwise,
the worker gets compensation c˜0 > 0, updates his belief next period, and reconsid-
ers. The state vector is z = (w, µ,γ) ∈ R++ ×R×R++ =: Z. For any integrable
function h, the stochastic kernel P satisfies∫
h(z′)P(z, dz′) =
∫
h(w′, µ′,γ′) f (w′|µ,γ)dw′, (8)
where µ′ and γ′ are defined by (7). The exit payoff is r(w) = u(w)/(1− β), and
the flow continuation payoff is c ≡ c0 := u(c˜0). If δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1, assumption 2.1
holds by letting n := 1, g(µ,γ) := e(1−δ)µ+(1−δ)2γ/2, m := 1 and d := 0. If δ = 1,
assumption 2.1 holds with n := 1, g(µ,γ) := e−µ+γ/2 + eµ+γ/2, m := 1 and d := 0.
See appendix B for a detailed proof.
Remark 2.5. Since in example 2.3, the wage process (wt)t≥0 is independent and
has unbounded support R+, the local contraction method cannot be applied.
Remark 2.6. From (8) we know that the conditional expectation of the reward func-
tions in example 2.3 is defined on a space of lower dimension than the state space.
Although there are 3 states, E z|r(Z1)| is a function of only 2 arguments: µ and γ.
Hence, taking conditional expectation makes it easier to find an appropriate g func-
tion. Indeed, if the standard weighted supnorm method were applied, one need to
find a g˜(w, µ,γ) with geometric drift property that dominates |r| (see, e.g., section
4 of Boyd (1990), or, assumptions 1–4 of Dura´n (2003)), which is more challenging
due to the higher state dimension. This type of problem is pervasive in economics.
Sections 4–5 provide a systematic study, along with a list of applications.
6 In general, ξ can be a stochastic process, e.g., ξt+1 = ρξt + ε
ξ
t+1, (ε
ξ
t )
IID∼ N(0,γξ). We consider
such an extension in a firm entry framework in section 5.3.
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2.3. The Continuation Value Operator. The continuation value function associated
with the sequential decision problem (1) is defined at z ∈ Z by
ψ∗(z) := c(z) + β
∫
v∗(z′)P(z, dz′). (9)
Under assumption 2.1, the value function is a solution to the Bellman equation, i.e.,
v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗. To see this, by theorem 1.11 of Peskir and Shiryaev (2006), it suffices
to show that
E z
(
sup
k≥0
∣∣∣∣∣k−1∑t=0 βtc(Zt) + βkr(Zk)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
< ∞
for all z ∈ Z. This obviously holds since
sup
k≥0
∣∣∣∣∣k−1∑t=0 βtc(Zt) + βkr(Zk)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑t≥0 βt[|r(Zt)|+ |c(Zt)|]
with probability one, and by lemma 7.1 (see (35) in appendix A), the right hand
side is Pz-integrable for all z ∈ Z.
To obtain some fundamental optimality results concerning the continuation value
function, define an operator Q by
Qψ(z) = c(z) + β
∫
max{r(z′),ψ(z′)}P(z, dz′). (10)
We call Q the Jovanovic operator or the continuation value operator. As shown below,
fixed points of Q are continuation value functions. From them we can derive value
functions, optimal policies and so on. To begin with, recall n, m and d defined
in assumption 2.1. Let m′, d′ > 0 such that m + 2m′ > 1, β(m + 2m′) < 1 and
d′ ≥ d/(m + 2m′ − 1). Let the weight function ` : Z→ R be
`(z) := m′
(
n−1
∑
t=1
E z|r(Zt)|+
n−1
∑
t=0
E z|c(Zt)|
)
+ g(z) + d′. (11)
We have the following optimality result.
Theorem 2.1. Under assumption 2.1, the following statements are true:
1. Q is a contraction mapping on (b`Z, ‖ · ‖`) of modulus β(m + 2m′).
2. The unique fixed point of Q in b`Z is ψ∗.
3. The policy defined by σ∗(z) = 1{r(z) ≥ ψ∗(z)} is an optimal policy.
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Remark 2.7. If both r and c are bounded, then ` can be chosen as a constant, and Q
is a contraction mapping of modulus β on (bZ, ‖ · ‖). If assumption 2.1 is satisfied
for n = 0, then the weight function `(z) = g(z) + d′. If assumption 2.1 holds for
n = 1, then `(z) = m′|c(z)|+ g(z) + d′.
Example 2.4. Recall the job search problem of example 2.2. Let g, n, m and d be
defined as in that example. Define ` as in (11). The Jovanovic operator is
Qψ(z) = c0 + β
∫
max
{
u(w(z′))
1− β ,ψ(z
′)
}
f (z′|z)dz′.
Since assumption 2.1 holds, theorem 2.1 implies that Q has a unique fixed point in
b`Z that coincides with the continuation value function, which, in this case, can be
interpreted as the expected value of unemployment.
Example 2.5. Recall the adaptive search model of example 2.3. Let ` be defined by
(11). The Jovanovic operator is
Qψ(µ,γ) = c0 + β
∫
max
{
u(w′)
1− β ,ψ(µ
′,γ′)
}
f (w′|µ,γ)dw′, (12)
where µ′ and γ′ are defined by (7). As shown in example 2.3, assumption 2.1 holds.
By theorem 2.1, Q is a contraction mapping on (b`Z, ‖ · ‖`) with unique fixed point
ψ∗, the expected value of unemployment.
Example 2.6. Consider an infinite-horizon American option (see, e.g., Shiryaev
(1999) or Duffie (2010)). Let the state process be as in (4) so that the state space
Z := R. Let pt = p(Zt) = exp(Zt) be the current price of the underlying asset, and
γ > 0 be the riskless rate of return (i.e., β = e−γ). The exit payoff for a call option
with a strike price K is r(z) = (p(z)− K)+, while the flow continuation payoff is
c ≡ 0. The Jovanovic operator for the option satisfies
Qψ(z) = e−γ
∫
max{(p(z′)− K)+,ψ(z′)} f (z′|z)dz′.
If ρ ∈ (−1, 1), we can let ξ := |b|+ σ2/2 and n ∈ N0 such that e−γ+|ρn|ξ < 1, then
assumption 2.1 holds with g(z) := eρ
nz + e−ρnz and m := d := e|ρn|ξ . Moreover,
if e−γ+ξ < 1, then assumption 2.1 holds (with n = 0) for all ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. For ` as
defined by (11), theorem 2.1 implies that Q admits a unique fixed point in b`Z that
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coincides with ψ∗, the expected value of retaining the option and exercising at a
later stage. The proof is similar to that of example 2.2 and thus omitted.
Example 2.7. Firm’s R&D decisions are often modeled as a sequential search pro-
cess for better technologies (see, e.g., Jovanovic and Rob (1989), Bental and Peled
(1996), Perla and Tonetti (2014)). In each period, an idea with value Zt ∈ Z := R+ is
observed, and the firm decides whether to put this idea into productive use, or de-
velop it further by investing in R&D. The former choice gives a payoff r(Zt) = Zt.
The latter incurs a fixed cost c0 > 0 so as to create a new technology. Let the R&D
process be governed by the exponential law of motion (with rate θ > 0),
F(z′|z) := P(Zt+1 ≤ z′|Zt = z) = 1− e−θ(z′−z) (z′ ≥ z), (13)
While the payoff functions are unbounded, assumption 2.1 is satisfied with n := 0,
g(z) := z, m := 1 and d := 1/θ. The Jovanovic operator satisfies
Qψ(z) = −c0 + β
∫
max{z′, ψ(z′)}dF(z′|z).
With ` as in (11), Q is a contraction mapping on b`Z with unique fixed point ψ∗,
the expected value of investing in R&D. The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Example 2.8. Consider a firm exit problem (see, e.g., Hopenhayn (1992), Eric-
son and Pakes (1995), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Asplund and Nocke
(2006), Poschke (2010), Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2012), Cos¸ar et al. (2016)). Each
period, a productivity shock at is observed by an incumbent firm, where at =
a(Zt) = eZt , and the state process Zt ∈ Z := R is defined by (4). The firm then
decides whether to exit the market next period or not (before observing a′). A
fixed cost c f > 0 is paid each period by the incumbent firm. The firm’s output
is q(a, l) = alα, where α ∈ (0, 1) and l is labor demand. Given output and in-
put prices p and w, the payoff functions are r(z) = c(z) = Ga(z)
1
1−α − c f , where
G = (αp/w)
1
1−α (1− α)w/α. The Jovanovic operator satisfies
Qψ(z) =
(
Ga(z)
1
1−α − c f
)
+ β
∫
max
{
Ga(z′)
1
1−α − c f ,ψ(z′)
}
f (z′|z)dz′.
For ρ ∈ [0, 1), choose n ∈ N0 such that βeρnξ < 1, where ξ := b1−α + σ
2
2(1−α)2 .
Then assumption 2.1 holds with g(z) := eρ
nz/(1−α) and m := d := eρnξ . Moreover,
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if βeξ < 1, then assumption 2.1 holds (with n = 0) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The case
ρ ∈ [−1, 0] is similar. By theorem 2.1, Q admits a unique fixed point in b`Z that
corresponds to ψ∗, the expected value of staying in the industry next period.7
Example 2.9. Consider agent’s learning in a firm exit framework (see, e.g., Jo-
vanovic (1982), Pakes and Ericson (1998), Mitchell (2000), Timoshenko (2015)). Let
q be firm’s output, C(q) a cost function, and C(q)x be the total cost, where the state
process (xt)t≥0 satisfies ln xt = ξ + εt, (εt)
IID∼ N(0,γε) with ξ denoting the firm
type. Beginning each period, the firm observes x and decides whether to exit the
industry or not. The prior belief is ξ ∼ N(µ,γ), so the posterior after observing
x′ is ξ|x′ ∼ N(µ′,γ′), where γ′ = (1/γ+ 1/γε)−1 and µ′ = γ′ (µ/γ+ (ln x′)/γε).
Let pi(p, x) = max
q
[pq− C(q)x] be the maximal profit, and r(p, x) be the profit of
other industries, where p is price. Consider, for example, C(q) := q2, and (pt)t≥0
satisfies ln pt+1 = ρ ln pt + b + ε
p
t+1, (ε
p
t )t≥0
IID∼ N(0,γp). Let z := (p, x, µ,γ) ∈
R
2
+ ×R×R+ =: Z. Then the Jovanovic operator satisfies
Qψ(z) = pi(p, x) + β
∫
max{r(p′, x′),ψ(z′)}l(p′, x′|p, µ,γ)d(p′, x′),
where l(p′, x′|p, µ,γ) := h(p′|p) f (x′|µ,γ) with h(p′|p) := LN(ρ ln p + b,γp) and
f (x′|µ,γ) := LN(µ,γ+ γε). If ρ ∈ (−1, 1) and |r(p, x)| ≤ h1p2/x + h2 for some
constants h1, h2 ∈ R+, let ξ := 2(|b|+ γp) and choose n ∈ N0 such that βe|ρn|ξ < 1.
Define δ such that δ ≥ e|ρn|ξ/
(
e|ρn|ξ − 1
)
.8 Then assumption 2.1 holds by letting
g(p, µ,γ) :=
(
p2ρ
n
+ p−2ρn + δ
)
e−µ+γ/2, m := e|ρn|ξ and d := 0. Hence, Q admits
a unique fixed point in b`Z that equals ψ∗, the value of staying in the industry.9
7 The proof is similar to that of example 2.2. Here we are considering the case ρ ∈ [−1, 0] and
ρ ∈ [0, 1] separately. Alternatively, we can treat ρ ∈ [−1, 1] directly as in examples 2.2 and 2.6. As
shown in the proof of example 2.2, the former provides a simpler g function when ρ ≥ 0.
8 Implicitly, we are considering ρ 6= 0. The case ρ = 0 is trivial.
9 In fact, the same result holds for more general settings, e.g., |r(p, x)| ≤ h1 p2/x + h2 p2 +
h3x−1 + h4x + h5 for some h1, ..., h5 ∈ R+.
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3. PROPERTIES OF CONTINUATION VALUES
In this section we explore some further properties of the continuation value func-
tion. As one of the most significant results, ψ∗ is shown to be continuously differ-
entiable under certain assumptions.
3.1. Continuity. We first develop a theory for the continuity of the fixed point.
Assumption 3.1. The stochastic kernel P satisfies the Feller property, i.e., P maps
bounded continuous functions into bounded continuous functions.
Assumption 3.2. The functions c, r and z 7→ ∫ |r(z′)|P(z, dz′) are continuous.
Assumption 3.3. The functions ` and z 7→ ∫ `(z′)P(z, dz′) are continuous.
Proposition 3.1. Under assumptions 2.1 and 3.1–3.3, ψ∗ and v∗ are continuous.
The next result treats the special case when P admits a density representation. The
proof is similar to that of proposition 3.1, except that we use lemma 7.2 instead of
the generalized Fatou’s lemma of Feinberg et al. (2014) to establish continuity in
(43). In this way, notably, the continuity of r is not necessary for the continuity of
ψ∗. The proof is omitted.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose assumptions 2.1 and 3.3 hold, P admits a density representation
f (z′|z) that is continuous in z, and that z 7→ ∫ |r(z′)| f (z′|z)dz′ and c are continuous,
then ψ∗ is continuous. If in addition r is continuous, then v∗ is continuous.
Remark 3.1. By proposition 3.1, if the payoffs r and c are bounded, assumption
3.1 and the continuity of r and c are sufficient for the continuity of ψ∗ and v∗. If
in addition P has a density representation f , by corollary 3.1, the continuity of the
flow payoff c and z 7→ f (z′|z) (for all z′ ∈ Z) is sufficient for ψ∗ to be continuous.10
Based on these, the continuity of ψ∗ and v∗ of example 2.1 can be established.
10 Notice that in these cases, ` can be chosen as a constant, so assumption 3.3 holds naturally.
18
Remark 3.2. If assumption 2.1 satisfies for n = 0 and assumption 3.1 holds, then
assumptions 3.2–3.3 are equivalent to: r, c, g and z 7→ E zg(Z1) are continuous.11
If assumption 2.1 holds for n = 1 and assumptions 3.1–3.2 are satisfied, then as-
sumption 3.3 holds if and only if g and z 7→ E z|c(Z1)|,E zg(Z1) are continuous.
Example 3.1. Recall the job search model of examples 2.2 and 2.4. By corollary
3.1, ψ∗ and v∗ are continuous. Here is the proof. Assumption 2.1 holds, as was
shown. P has a density representation f (z′|z) = N(ρz + b, σ2) that is continuous
in z. Moreover, r, c and g are continuous. It remains to verify assumption 3.3.
Case I: δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1. The proof of example 2.2 shows that z 7→ E z|r(Zt)| is
continuous for all t ∈ N, and that z 7→ E zg(Z1) is continuous (recall (36)–(37) in
appendix B). By the definition of ` in (11), assumption 3.3 holds.
Case II: δ = 1. Recall that assumption 2.1 holds for n = 0 and g(z) = |z|. Since
z 7→ ∫ |z′| f (z′|z)dz′ is continuous by properties of the normal distribution, z 7→
E zg(Z1),E z|r(Z1)| are continuous.12 Hence, assumption 3.3 holds.
Example 3.2. Recall the adaptive search model of examples 2.3 and 2.5. Assump-
tion 2.1 holds for n = 1, as already shown. Assumption 3.1 follows from (8)
and lemma 7.2. Moreover, r, c and g are continuous. In the proof of example
2.3, we have shown that (µ,γ) 7→ E µ,γ|r(w′)|,E µ,γg(µ′,γ′) are continuous (see
(39)–(41) in appendix B), where E µ,γg(µ′,γ′) is defined by (40) and E µ,γ|r(w′)| :=∫ |r(w′)| f (w′|µ,γ)dw′. Since ` = m′|c|+ g + d′ when n = 1, assumptions 3.2–3.3
hold. By proposition 3.1, ψ∗ and v∗ are continuous.
Example 3.3. Recall the option pricing model of example 2.6. By corollary 3.1, we
can show that ψ∗ and v∗ are continuous. The proof is similar to example 3.1, except
that we use |r(z)| ≤ ez +K, the continuity of z 7→ ∫ (ez′ +K) f (z′|z)dz′, and lemma
11 When n = 0, `(z) = g(z) + d′, so |r| ≤ G(g + d′) for some constant G. Since r, g and
z 7→ E zg(Z1) are continuous, Feinberg et al. (2014) (theorem 1.1) implies that z 7→ E z|r(Z1)| is
continuous. The next claim in this remark can be proved similarly.
12 Indeed,
∫ |z′| f (z′|z)dz′ = √2σ2/pi e−(ρz+b)2/2σ2 + (ρz + b) [1− 2Φ (−(ρz + b)/σ)], where Φ
is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The continuity can also be proved by lemma 7.2.
19
7.2 to show that z 7→ E z|r(Z1)| is continuous. The continuity of z 7→ E z|r(Zt)| (for
all t ∈ N) then follows from induction.
Example 3.4. Recall the R&D decision problem of example 2.7. Assumption 2.1
holds for n = 0. For all bounded continuous function h : Z→ R, lemma 7.2 shows
that z 7→ ∫ h(z′)P(z, dz′) is continuous, so assumption 3.1 holds. Moreover, r, c
and g are continuous, and∫
|z′|P(z, dz′) =
∫
[z,∞)
z′θe−θ(z
′−z) dz′ = z + 1/θ
implies that z 7→ E z|r(Z1)|,E z|g(Z1)| are continuous. Since `(z) = g(z)+ d′ when
n = 0, assumptions 3.2–3.3 hold. By proposition 3.1, ψ∗ and v∗ are continuous.
Example 3.5. Recall the firm exit model of example 2.8. Through similar analysis
as in examples 3.1 and 3.3, we can show that ψ∗ and v∗ are continuous.
Example 3.6. Recall the firm exit model of example 2.9. Assumption 2.1 holds,
as was shown. The flow continuation payoff pi(p, x) = p2/(4x) since C(q) = q2.
Recall that z = (p, x, µ,γ), and for all integrable h, we have∫
h(z′)P(z, dz′) =
∫
h(p′, x′, µ′,γ′)l(p′, x′|p, µ,γ)d(p′, x′).
Since by definition γ′ is continuous in γ and µ′ is continuous in µ,γ and x′, as-
sumption 3.1 holds by lemma 7.2. Further, induction shows that for some constant
at and all t ∈ N, ∫
|pi(p′, x′)|Pt(z, dz′) = at p2ρt e−µ+γ/2,
which is continuous in (p, µ,γ). If r(p, x) is continuous, then, by lemma 7.2 and
induction (similarly as in example 3.3), (p, µ,γ) 7→ ∫ |r(p′, x′)|Pt(z, dz′) is contin-
uous for all t ∈ N. Moreover, g is continuous and∫
g(p′, µ′,γ′)P(z, dz′) =
(
p2ρ
n+1
e2ρ
nb+2ρ2nγp + p−2ρ
n+1
e−2ρ
nb+2ρ2nγp + δ
)
e−µ+γ/2,
which is continuous in (p, µ,γ). Hence, assumptions 3.2–3.3 hold. Proposition 3.1
then implies that ψ∗ and v∗ are continuous.
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3.2. Monotonicity. We now study monotonicity under the following assumptions.
Assumption 3.4. The flow continuation payoff c is increasing (resp. decreasing).
Assumption 3.5. The function z 7→ ∫ max{r(z′),ψ(z′)}P(z, dz′) is increasing (resp.
decreasing) for all increasing (resp. decreasing) function ψ ∈ b`Z.
Assumption 3.6. The exit payoff r is increasing (resp. decreasing).
Remark 3.3. If assumption 3.6 holds and P is stochastically increasing in the sense
that P(z, ·) (first order) stochastically dominates P(z˜, ·) for all z˜ ≤ z, then assump-
tion 3.5 holds.
Proposition 3.2. Under assumptions 2.1 and 3.4–3.5, ψ∗ is increasing (resp. decreasing).
If in addition assumption 3.6 holds, then v∗ is increasing (resp. decreasing).
Proof of proposition 3.2. Let b`iZ (resp. b`dZ) be the set of increasing (resp. decreas-
ing) functions in b`Z. Then b`iZ (resp. b`dZ) is a closed subset of b`Z.
13 To show
that ψ∗ is increasing (resp. decreasing), it suffices to verify that Q(b`iZ) ⊂ b`iZ
(resp. Q(b`dZ) ⊂ b`dZ).14 The assumptions of the proposition guarantee that this
is the case. Since, in addition, r is increasing (resp. decreasing) by assumption and
v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗, v∗ is increasing (resp. decreasing). 
Example 3.7. Recall the job search model of examples 2.2, 2.4 and 3.1. Assumption
2.1, 3.4 and 3.6 hold. If ρ ≥ 0, the stochastic kernel P is stochastically increasing
since the density kernel is f (z′|z) = N(ρz + b, σ2), so assumption 3.5 holds. By
proposition 3.2, ψ∗ and v∗ are increasing.
Remark 3.4. Similarly, we can show that for the option pricing model of example
2.6 and the firm exit model of example 2.8, ψ∗ and v∗ are increasing if ρ ≥ 0.
Moreover, ψ∗ and v∗ are increasing in example 2.7. The details are omitted.
13 Let (φn) ⊂ b`iZ such that ρ`(φn, φ) → 0, then φn → φ pointwise. Since (b`Z, ρ`) is complete,
φ ∈ b`Z. For all x, y ∈ Z with x < y, φ(x)− φ(y) = [φ(x)− φn(x)] + [φn(x)− φn(y)] + [φn(y)−
φ(y)]. The second term on the right side is nonpositive, ∀n. Taking limit supremum on both sides
yields φ(x) ≤ φ(y). Hence, φ ∈ b`iZ and b`iZ is a closed subset. The case b`dZ is similar.
14 See, e.g., Stokey et al. (1989), corollary 1 of theorem 3.2.
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Example 3.8. Recall the job search model of examples 2.3, 2.5 and 3.2. Note that
r(w) is increasing, µ′ is increasing in µ, and f (w′|µ,γ) = N(µ,γ+ γε) is stochasti-
cally increasing in µ. So E µ,γ(r(w′) ∨ ψ(µ′,γ′)) is increasing in µ for all candidate
ψ that is increasing in µ. Since c ≡ c0, by proposition 3.2, ψ∗ and v∗ are increasing
in µ. Since r is increasing in w, v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗ is increasing in w.
Example 3.9. Recall the firm exit model of examples 2.9 and 3.6. The flow con-
tinuation payoff pi(p, x) = p2/(4x) is increasing in p and decreasing in x. Since
P(r ∨ ψ∗) is not a function of x, ψ∗ is decreasing in x. If the exit payoff r(p, x) is
decreasing in x, then v∗ is decreasing in x. If ρ ≥ 0 and r(p, x) is increasing in p,
since h(p′|p) = LN(ρ ln p + b,γp) is stochastically increasing, P(r ∨ ψ) is increas-
ing in p for all candidate ψ that is increasing in p. By proposition 3.2, ψ∗ and v∗ are
increasing in p. Recall that µ′ is increasing in µ. Since f (x′|µ,γ) := LN(µ,γ+ γε)
is stochastically increasing in µ, P(r ∨ ψ) is decreasing in µ for all candidate ψ that
is decreasing in µ. By proposition 3.2, ψ∗ and v∗ are decreasing in µ.
3.3. Differentiability. Suppose Z ⊂ Rm. For i = 1, ..., m, let Z(i) be the i-th dimen-
sion and Z(−i) the remaining m− 1 dimensions of Z. A typical element z ∈ Z takes
form of z = (z1, ..., zm). Let z−i := (z1, ..., zi−1, zi+1, ..., zm). Given z0 ∈ Z and δ > 0,
let Bδ(zi0) := {zi ∈ Z(i) : |zi − zi0| < δ} and B¯δ(zi0) be its closure.
Given h : Z→ R, let Dih(z) := ∂h(z)/∂zi and D2i h(z) := ∂2h(z)/∂(zi)
2. For a den-
sity kernel f , let Di f (z′|z) := ∂ f (z′|z)/∂zi and D2i f (z′|z) := ∂2 f (z′|z)/∂(zi)2. Let
µ(z) :=
∫
max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)} f (z′|z)dz′, µi(z) :=
∫
max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}Di f (z′|z)dz′,
and denote k1(z) := r(z) and k2(z) := `(z).
Assumption 3.7. Dic(z) exists for all z ∈ int(Z) and i = 1, ..., m.
Assumption 3.8. P has a density representation f , and, for i = 1, ..., m:
(1) D2i f (z
′|z) exits for all (z, z′) ∈ int(Z)× Z;
(2) (z, z′) 7→ Di f (z′|z) is continuous;
(3) There are finite solutions of zi to D2i f (z
′|z) = 0 (denoted by z∗i (z′, z−i)), and,
for all z0 ∈ int(Z), there exist δ > 0 and a compact subset A ⊂ Z such that
z′ /∈ A implies z∗i (z′, z−i0 ) /∈ Bδ(zi0).
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Remark 3.5. When the state space is unbounded above and below, for example,
a sufficient condition for assumption 3.8-(3) is: there are finite solutions of zi to
D2i f (z
′|z) = 0, and, for all z0 ∈ int(Z), ‖z′‖ → ∞ implies |z∗i (z′, z−i0 )| → ∞.
Assumption 3.9. k j is continuous, and, int(Z) 3 z 7→
∫ |k j(z′)Di f (z′|z)|dz′ ∈ R+
for i = 1, ..., m and j = 1, 2.
The following provides a general result for the differentiability of ψ∗.
Proposition 3.3. Under assumptions 2.1 and 3.7–3.9, ψ∗ is differentiable at interior
points, with Diψ∗(z) = Dic(z) + µi(z) for all z ∈ int(Z) and i = 1, ..., m.
Proof of proposition 3.3. Fix z0 ∈ int(Z). By assumption 3.8-(3), there exist δ > 0
and a compact subset A ⊂ Z such that z′ ∈ Ac implies z∗i (z′, z−i0 ) /∈ Bδ(zi0), hence
sup
zi∈B¯δ(zi0)
|Di f (z′|z)| = |Di f (z′|z)|zi=zi0+δ ∨ |Di f (z
′|z)|zi=zi0−δ (given z
−i = z−i0 ). By
assumption 3.8-(2), given z−i = z−i0 , there exists G ∈ R+, such that
sup
zi∈B¯δ(zi0)
|Di f (z′|z)| ≤ sup
z′∈A,zi∈B¯δ(zi0)
|Di f (z′|z)| · 1(z′ ∈ A)
+
(
|Di f (z′|z)|zi=zi0+δ ∨ |Di f (z
′|z)|zi=zi0−δ
)
· 1(z′ ∈ Ac)
≤ G · 1(z′ ∈ A)
+
(
|Di f (z′|z)|zi=zi0+δ + |Di f (z
′|z)|zi=zi0−δ
)
· 1(z′ ∈ Ac).
Assumption 3.9 then shows that condition (2) of lemma 7.3 holds. By assumption
3.7 and lemma 7.3, Diψ∗(z) = Dic(z) + µi(z), ∀z ∈ int(Z), as was to be shown. 
3.4. Smoothness. Now we are ready to study smoothness (i.e., continuous differ-
entiability), an essential property for numerical computation and characterizing
optimal policies.
Assumption 3.10. For i = 1, ..., m and j = 1, 2, the following conditions hold:
(1) z 7→ Dic(z) is continuous on int(Z);
(2) k j is continuous, and, z 7→
∫ |k j(z′)Di f (z′|z)|dz′ is continuous on int(Z).
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The next result provides sufficient conditions for smoothness.
Proposition 3.4. Under assumptions 2.1, 3.8 and 3.10, z 7→ Diψ∗(z) is continuous on
int(Z) for i = 1, ..., m.
Proof of proposition 3.4. Since assumption 3.10 implies assumptions 3.7 and 3.9, by
proposition 3.3, Diψ∗(z) = Dic(z) + µi(z) on int(Z). Since Dic(z) is continuous by
assumption 3.10-(1), to show that ψ∗ is continuously differentiable, it remains to
verify: z 7→ µi(z) is continuous on int(Z). Since |ψ∗| ≤ G` for some G ∈ R+,∣∣max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}Di f (z′|z)∣∣ ≤ (|r(z′)|+ G`(z′))|Di f (z′|z)|, ∀z′, z ∈ Z. (14)
By assumptions 3.8 and 3.10-(2), the right side of (14) is continuous in z, and z 7→∫
[|r(z′)|+ G`(z′)]|Di f (z′|z)|dz′ is continuous. Lemma 7.2 then implies that z 7→
µi(z) =
∫
max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}Di f (z′|z)dz′ is continuous, as was to be shown. 
Example 3.10. Recall the job search model of example 2.2 (subsequently studied
by examples 2.4, 3.1 and 3.7). For all a ∈ R, let h(z) := ea(ρz+b)+a2σ2/2/
√
2piσ2. We
can show that the following statements hold:
(a) There are two solutions to ∂
2 f (z′|z)
∂z2 = 0 : z
∗(z′) = z′−b±σρ ;
(b)
∫ ∣∣∣ ∂ f (z′|z)∂z ∣∣∣dz′ = |ρ|σ √ 2pi ;
(c)
∣∣∣z′ ∂ f (z′|z)∂z ∣∣∣ ≤ 1√2piσ2 exp{− (z′−ρz−b)22σ2 } ( |ρ|σ2 z′2 + |ρ(ρz+b)|σ2 |z′|);
(d) eaz
′ ∣∣∣ ∂ f (z′|z)∂z ∣∣∣ ≤ h(z) exp{− [z′−(ρz+b+aσ2)]22σ2 } |ρz′|+|ρ(ρz+b)|σ2 , ∀a ∈ R;
(e) The four terms on both sides of (c) and (d) are continuous in z;
(f) The integrations (w.r.t. z′) of the two terms on the right side of (c) and (d)
are continuous in z.
Remark 3.5 and (a) imply that assumption 3.8-(3) holds. If δ = 1, assumption 3.10-
(2) holds by conditions (b), (c), (e), (f) and lemma 7.2. If δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1, based
on (36) (appendix B), conditions (b) and (d)–(f), and lemma 7.2, we can show that
assumption 3.10-(2) holds. The other assumptions of proposition 3.4 are easy to
verify. Hence, ψ∗ is continuously differentiable.
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Example 3.11. Recall the option pricing problem of example 2.6 (subsequently
studied by example 3.3 and remark 3.4). Through similar analysis as in example
3.10, we can show that ψ∗ is continuously differentiable.15
Example 3.12. Recall the firm exit model of example 2.8 (subsequently studied
by example 3.5 and remark 3.4). Through similar analysis to examples 3.10–3.11,
we can show that ψ∗ is continuously differentiable. Figure 1 illustrates. We set
β = 0.95, σ = 1, b = 0, c f = 5, α = 0.5, p = 0.15, w = 0.15, and consider
respectively ρ = 0.7 and ρ = −0.7. While ψ∗ is smooth, v∗ is kinked at around
z = 1.5 when ρ = 0.7, and has two kinks when ρ = −0.7.
FIGURE 1. Comparison of ψ∗ and v∗
3.5. Parametric Continuity. Consider the parameter space Θ ⊂ Rk. Let Pθ, rθ, cθ,
v∗θ and ψ
∗
θ denote the stochastic kernel, exit and flow continuation payoffs, value
and continuation value functions with respect to the parameter θ ∈ Θ, respectively.
Similarly, let nθ, mθ, dθ and gθ denote the key elements in assumption 2.1 with
respect to θ. Define n := sup
θ∈Θ
nθ, m := sup
θ∈Θ
mθ and d := sup
θ∈Θ
dθ.
Assumption 3.11. Assumption 2.1 holds at all θ ∈ Θ, with βm < 1 and n, d < ∞.
15 This holds even if the exit payoff r(z) = (p(z)− K)+ has a kink at z = p−1(K). Hence, the
differentiability of the exit payoff is not necessary for the smoothness of the continuation value.
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Under this assumption, let m′ > 0 and d′ > 0 such that m+ 2m′ > 1, β(m+ 2m′) <
1 and d′ ≥ d/(m + 2m′ − 1). Consider ` : Z×Θ→ R defined by
`(z, θ) := m′
(
n−1
∑
t=1
E
θ
z|rθ(Zt)|+
n−1
∑
t=0
E
θ
z|cθ(Zt)|
)
+ gθ(z) + d′,
where E θz denotes the conditional expectation with respect to Pθ(z, ·).
Remark 3.6. We implicitly assume that Θ does not include β. However, by letting
β ∈ [0, a] and a ∈ [0, 1), we can incorporate β into Θ. βm < 1 in assumption 3.11 is
then replaced by am < 1. All the parametric continuity results of this paper remain
true after this change.
Assumption 3.12. Pθ(z, ·) satisfies the Feller property, i.e., (z, θ) 7→
∫
h(z′)Pθ(z, dz′)
is continuous for all bounded continuous function h : Z→ R.
Assumption 3.13. (z, θ) 7→ cθ(z), rθ(z), `(z, θ),
∫ |rθ(z′)|Pθ(z, dz′), ∫ `(z′, θ)Pθ(z, dz′)
are continuous.
The following result is a simple extension of proposition 3.1. We omit its proof.
Proposition 3.5. Under assumptions 3.11–3.13, (z, θ) 7→ ψ∗θ (z), v∗θ(z) are continuous.
Example 3.13. Recall the job search model of example 2.2 (subsequently studied by
examples 2.4, 3.1, 3.7 and 3.10). Let the parameter space Θ := [−1, 1]× A× B× C,
where A, B are bounded subsets of R++,R, respectively, and C ⊂ R. A typical
element θ ∈ Θ is θ = (ρ, σ, b, c0). Proposition 3.5 implies that (θ, z) 7→ ψ∗θ (z) and
(θ, z) 7→ v∗θ(z) are continuous. The proof is similar to example 3.1 and omitted.
Remark 3.7. The parametric continuity of all the other examples discussed above
can be established in a similar manner.
4. OPTIMAL POLICIES
In this section, we provide a systematic study of optimal timing of decisions when
there are threshold states, and explore the key properties of the optimal policies.
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4.1. Conditional Independence in Transitions. For a broad range of problems,
the continuation value function exists in a lower dimensional space than the value
function. Moreover, the relationship is asymmetric. While each state variable that
appears in the continuation value must appear in the value function, the converse
is not true. The continuation value function can have strictly fewer arguments than
the value function (recall example 2.3).
To verify, suppose that the state space Z ⊂ Rm and can be written as Z = X× Y,
where X is a convex subset of Rm0 , Y is a convex subset of Rm−m0 , and m0 ∈ N
such that m0 < m. The state process (Zt)t≥0 is then {(Xt, Yt)}t≥0, where (Xt)t≥0
and (Yt)t≥0 are two stochastic processes taking values in X and Y, respectively. In
particular, for each t ≥ 0, Xt represents the first m0 dimensions and Yt the rest
m−m0 dimensions of the period-t state Zt.
Assume that the stochastic processes (Xt)t≥0 and (Yt)t≥0 are conditionally indepen-
dent, in the sense that conditional on each Yt, the next period states (Xt+1, Yt+1)
and Xt are independent. Let z := (x, y) and z′ := (x′, y′) be the current and next
period states, respectively. With conditional independence, the stochastic kernel
P(z, dz′) can be represented by the conditional distribution of (x′, y′) on y, denoted
as Fy(x′, y′), i.e., P(z, dz′) = P((x, y), d(x′, y′)) = dFy(x′, y′).
Assume further that the flow continuation payoff c is defined on Y, i.e., c : Y →
R.16 Under this setup, ψ∗ has strictly fewer arguments than v∗. While v∗ is a func-
tion of both x and y, ψ∗ is a function of y only. Hence, the continuation value based
method allows us to mitigate one of the primary stumbling blocks for numerical
dynamic programming: the so-called curse of dimensionality (see, e.g., Bellman
(1969), Rust (1997)).
4.2. The Threshold State Problem. Among problems where conditional indepen-
dence exists, the optimal policy is usually determined by a reservation rule, in the
sense that the decision process terminates whenever a specific state variable hits a
threshold level. In such cases, the continuation value based method allows for a
16 Indeed, in many applications, the flow payoff c is a constant, as seen in previous examples.
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sharp analysis of the optimal policy. This type of problem is pervasive in quantita-
tive and theoretical economic modeling, as we now formulate.
For simplicity, we assume that m0 = 1, in which case X is a convex subset ofR and
Y is a convex subset ofRm−1. For each t ≥ 0, Xt represents the first dimension and
Yt the rest m− 1 dimensions of the period-t state Zt. If, in addition, r is monotone
on X, we call Xt the threshold state and Yt the environment state (or environment) of
period t, moreover, we call X the threshold state space and Y the environment space.
Assumption 4.1. r is strictly monotone on X. Moreover, for all y ∈ Y, there exists
x ∈ X such that r(x, y) = c(y) + β ∫ v∗(x′, y′)dFy(x′, y′).
Under assumption 4.1, the reservation rule property holds. When the exit payoff r is
strictly increasing in x, for instance, this property states that if the agent terminates
at x ∈ X at a given point of time, then he would have terminated at any higher
state at that moment. Specifically, there is a decision threshold x¯ : Y → X such that
when x attains this threshold level, i.e., x = x¯(y), the agent is indifferent between
stopping and continuing, i.e., r(x¯(y), y) = ψ∗(y) for all y ∈ Y.
As shown in theorem 2.1, the optimal policy satisfies σ∗(z) = 1{r(z) ≥ ψ∗(z)}. For
a sequential decision problem with threshold state, this policy is fully specified by
the decision threshold x¯. In particular, under assumption 4.1, we have
σ∗(x, y) =
{
1{x ≥ x¯(y)}, if r is strictly increasing in x
1{x ≤ x¯(y)}, if r is strictly decreasing in x (15)
Further, based on properties of the continuation value, properties of the decision
threshold can be established. The next result provides sufficient conditions for
continuity. The proof is similar to proposition 4.4 below and thus omitted.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose either assumptions of proposition 3.1 or of corollary 3.1 hold,
and that assumption 4.1 holds. Then x¯ is continuous.
The next result discusses monotonicity. The proof is obvious and we omit it.
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Proposition 4.2. Suppose assumptions of proposition 3.2 and assumption 4.1 hold, and
that r is defined on X. If ψ∗ is increasing and r is strictly increasing (resp. decreasing),
then x¯ is increasing (resp. decreasing). If ψ∗ is decreasing and r is strictly increasing (resp.
decreasing), then x¯ is decreasing (resp. increasing).
A typical element y ∈ Y is y = (y1, ..., ym−1). For given functions h : Y → R
and l : X × Y → R, define Dih(y) := ∂h(y)/∂yi, Dil(x, y) := ∂l(x, y)/∂yi, and
Dxl(x, y) := ∂l(x, y)/∂x. The next result follows immediately from proposition 3.4
and the implicit function theorem.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose assumptions of proposition 3.4 and assumption 4.1 hold, and
that r is continuously differentiable on int(Z). Then x¯ is continuously differentiable on
int(Y). In particular, Di x¯(y) = −Dir(x¯(y),y)−Diψ
∗(y)
Dxr(x¯(y),y)
for all y ∈ int(Y).
Intuitively, (x, y) 7→ r(x, y)− ψ∗(y) denotes the premium of terminating the deci-
sion process. Hence, (x, y) 7→ Dir(x, y)− Diψ∗(y), Dxr(x, y) are the instantaneous
rates of change of the terminating premium in response to changes in yi and x, re-
spectively. Holding aggregate premium null, the premium changes due to changes
in x and y cancel out. As a result, the rate of change of x¯(y) with respect to changes
in yi is equivalent to the ratio of the instantaneous rates of change in the premium.
The negativity is due to zero terminating premium at the decision threshold.
Let x¯θ be the decision threshold with respect to θ ∈ Θ. We have the following
result for parametric continuity.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose assumptions of proposition 3.5 and assumption 4.1 hold. Then
(y, θ) 7→ x¯θ(y) is continuous.
Proof of proposition 4.4. Define F : X× Y×Θ → R by F(x, y, θ) := rθ(x, y)− ψ∗θ (y).
Without loss of generality, assume that (x, y, θ) 7→ rθ(x, y) is strictly increasing in
x, then F is strictly increasing in x and continuous. For all fixed (y0, θ0) ∈ Y × Θ
and ε > 0, since F is strictly increasing in x and F(x¯θ0(y0), y0, θ0) = 0, we have
F(x¯θ0(y0) + ε, y0, θ0) > 0 and F(x¯θ0(y0)− ε, y0, θ0) < 0.
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Since F is continuous with respect to (y, θ), there exists δ > 0 such that for all
(y, θ) ∈ Bδ((y0, θ0)) := {(y, θ) ∈ Y×Θ : ‖(y, θ)− (y0, θ0)‖ < δ}, we have
F(x¯θ0(y0) + ε, y, θ) > 0 and F(x¯θ0(y0)− ε, y, θ) < 0.
Since F(x¯θ(y), y, θ) = 0 and F is strictly increasing in x, we have
x¯θ(y) ∈
(
x¯θ0(y0)− ε, x¯θ0(y0) + ε
)
, i.e., |x¯θ(y)− x¯θ0(y0)| < ε.
Hence, (y, θ) 7→ x¯θ(y) is continuous, as was to be shown. 
5. APPLICATIONS
In this section we consider several typical applications in economics, and compare
the computational efficiency of continuation value and value function based meth-
ods. Numerical experiments show that the partial impact of lower dimensionality
of the continuation value can be huge, even when the difference between the argu-
ments of this function and the value function is only a single variable.
5.1. Job Search II. Consider the adaptive search model of Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2012) (section 6.6). The model is as example 2.1, apart from the fact that the dis-
tribution of the wage process h is unknown. The worker knows that there are two
possible densities f and g, and puts prior probability pit on f being chosen. If the
current offer wt is rejected, a new offer wt+1 is observed at the beginning of next
period, and, by the Bayes’ rule, pit updates via
pit+1 = pit f (wt+1)/[pit f (wt+1) + (1− pit)g(wt+1)] =: q(wt+1,pit). (16)
The state space is Z := X× [0, 1], where X is a compact interval ofR+. Let u(w) :=
w. The value function of the unemployed worker satisfies
v∗(w,pi) = max
{
w
1− β , c0 + β
∫
v∗(w′, q(w′,pi))hpi(w′)dw′
}
,
where hpi(w′) := pi f (w′) + (1− pi)g(w′). This is a typical threshold state problem,
with threshold state x := w ∈ X and environment y := pi ∈ [0, 1] =: Y. As to be
shown, the optimal policy is determined by a reservation wage w¯ : [0, 1]→ R such
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that when w = w¯(pi), the worker is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the
offer. Consider the candidate space (b[0, 1], ‖ · ‖). The Jovanovic operator is
Qψ(pi) = c0 + β
∫
max
{
w′
1− β ,ψ ◦ q(w
′,pi)
}
hpi(w′)dw′. (17)
Proposition 5.1. Let c0 ∈ X. The following statements are true:
1. Q is a contraction on (b[0, 1], ‖ · ‖) of modulus β, with unique fixed point ψ∗.
2. The value function v∗(w,pi) = w1−β ∨ ψ∗(pi), reservation wage w¯(pi) = (1−
β)ψ∗(pi), and optimal policy σ∗(w,pi) = 1{w ≥ w¯(pi)} for all (w,pi) ∈ Z.
3. ψ∗, w¯ and v∗ are continuous.
Since the computation is 2-dimensional via value function iteration (VFI), and is
only 1-dimensional via continuation value function iteration (CVI), we expect the
computation via CVI to be much faster. We run several groups of tests and com-
pare the time taken by the two methods. All tests are processed in a standard
Python environment on a laptop with a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8GB RAM.
5.1.1. Group-1 Experiments. This group documents the time taken to compute the
fixed point across different parameter values and at different precision levels. Ta-
ble 1 provides the list of experiments performed and table 2 shows the result.
TABLE 1. Group-1 Experiments
Parameter Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5
β 0.9 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.95
c0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.001 1
Note: Different parameter values in each experiment.
As shown in table 2, CVI performs much better than VFI. On average, CVI is 141
times faster than VFI. In the best case, CVI is 207 times faster (in test 5, VFI takes
275.41 seconds to achieve a level of accuracy 10−3, while CVI takes only 1.33 sec-
onds). In the worst case, CVI is 109 times faster (in test 5, CVI takes 2.99 seconds
as opposed to 327.41 seconds by VFI to attain a precision level 10−6).
31
TABLE 2. Time Taken of Group-1 Experiments
Test/Method/Precision 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−6 10−7 10−8
Test 1
VFI 114.17 140.94 174.91 201.77 228.59 255.67
CVI 0.67 0.92 1.16 1.43 1.71 1.94
Test 2
VFI 181.78 234.58 271.89 323.22 339.87 341.55
CVI 0.95 1.49 1.80 2.27 2.69 3.11
Test 3
VFI 335.78 335.87 335.28 335.91 338.70 334.21
CVI 1.77 2.68 3.08 3.03 3.03 3.06
Test 4
VFI 154.18 201.05 247.72 294.90 335.32 335.00
CVI 0.79 1.22 1.65 2.06 2.50 2.91
Test 5
VFI 275.41 336.02 326.33 327.41 327.11 327.71
CVI 1.33 2.12 2.79 2.99 2.97 2.97
Note: We set X = [0, 2], f = Beta(1, 1) and g = Beta(3, 1.2). The grid points of (w,pi) lie in
[0, 2]× [10−4, 1− 10−4] with 100 points for w and 50 for pi. For each given test and level of precision,
we run the simulation 50 times for CVI, 20 times for VFI, and calculate the average time (in seconds).
5.1.2. Group-2 Experiments. In applications, increasing the number of grid points
provides more accurate numerical approximations. This group of tests compares
how the two approaches perform under different grid sizes. The setup and result
are summarized in table 3 and table 4, respectively.
TABLE 3. Group-2 Experiments
Variable Test 2 Test 6 Test 7 Test 8 Test 9 Test 10
pi 50 50 50 100 100 100
w 100 150 200 100 150 200
Note: Different grid sizes of the state variables in each experiment.
CVI outperforms VFI more obviously as the grid size increases. In table 4 we see
that as we increase the number of grid points for w, the speed of CVI is not affected.
However, the speed of VFI drops significantly. Amongst tests 2, 6 and 7, CVI is 219
times faster than VFI on average. In the best case, CVI is 386 times faster (while it
takes VFI 355.40 seconds to achieve a precision level 10−3 in test 7, CVI takes only
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TABLE 4. Time Taken of Group-2 Experiments
Test/Precision/Method 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−6 10−7 10−8
Test 2
VFI 181.78 234.58 271.89 323.22 339.87 341.55
CVI 0.95 1.49 1.80 2.27 2.69 3.11
Test 6
VFI 264.34 336.20 407.52 476.01 508.05 509.05
CVI 0.96 1.39 1.82 2.30 2.73 3.14
Test 7
VFI 355.40 449.55 545.51 641.05 679.93 678.28
CVI 0.92 1.37 1.79 2.22 2.84 3.07
Test 8
VFI 352.76 447.36 541.75 639.73 678.91 677.52
CVI 1.94 2.74 3.58 4.42 5.30 6.14
Test 9
VFI 526.72 670.19 812.66 951.78 1017.29 1015.15
CVI 1.81 2.68 3.68 4.33 5.23 6.08
Test 10
VFI 706.34 897.07 1086.15 1278.27 1354.37 1360.07
CVI 1.83 2.72 3.51 4.40 5.21 6.10
Note: We set X = [0, 2], β = 0.95, c0 = 0.6, f = Beta(1, 1) and g = Beta(3, 1.2). The grid points of (w,pi)
lie in [0, 2]× [10−4, 1− 10−4]. For each given test and precision level, we run the simulation 50 times for
CVI, 20 times for VFI, and calculate the average time (in seconds).
0.92 second). As we increase the grid size of w from 100 to 200, CVI is not affected,
but the time taken for VFI almost doubles.
As we increase the grid size of both w and pi, there is a slight decrease in the speed
of CVI. Nevertheless, the decrease in the speed of VFI is exponential. Among tests
2 and 8–10, CVI is 223.41 times as fast as VFI on average. In test 10, VFI takes 706.34
seconds to obtain a level of precision 10−3, instead, CVI takes only 1.83 seconds,
which is 386 times faster.
5.1.3. Group-3 Experiments. Since the total number of grid points increases expo-
nentially with the number of states, the speed of computation will drop dramat-
ically with an additional state. To illustrate, consider a parametric class problem
with respect to c0. We set X = [0, 2], β = 0.95, f = Beta(1, 1) and g = Beta(3, 1.2).
Let (w,pi, c0) lie in [0, 2]× [10−4, 1− 10−4]× [0, 1.5] with 100 grid points for each.
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In this case, VFI is 3-dimensional and suffers the ”curse of dimensionality”: the
computation takes more than 7 days. However, CVI is only 2-dimensional and the
computation finishes within 171 seconds (with precision 10−6).
In figure 2, we see that the reservation wage is increasing in c0 and decreasing
in pi. Intuitively, a higher level of compensation hinders the agent’s incentive of
entering into the labor market. Moreover, since f is a less attractive distribution
than g and larger pi means more weight on f and less on g, a larger pi depresses the
worker’s assessment of future prospects, and relatively low current offers become
more attractive.
FIGURE 2. The reservation wage
5.2. Job Search III. Recall the adaptive search model of example 2.3 (subsequently
studied by examples 2.5, 3.2 and 3.8). The value function satisfies
v∗(w, µ,γ) = max
{
u(w)
1− β , c0 + β
∫
v∗(w′, µ′,γ′) f (w′|µ,γ)dw′
}
. (18)
Recall the Jovanovic operator defined by (12). This is a threshold state sequential
decision problem, with threshold state x := w ∈ R++ =: X and environment
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y := (µ,γ) ∈ R×R++ =: Y. By the intermediate value theorem, assumption 4.1
holds. Hence, the optimal policy is determined by a reservation wage w¯ : Y → R
such that when w = w¯(µ,γ), the worker is indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the offer. Since all the assumptions of proposition 3.1 hold (see example
3.2), by proposition 4.1, w¯ is continuous. Since ψ∗ is increasing in µ (see example
3.8), by proposition 4.2, w¯ is increasing in µ.
In simulation, we set β = 0.95, γε = 1.0, c˜0 = 0.6, and consider different levels of
risk aversion: σ = 3, 4, 5, 6. The grid points of (µ,γ) lie in [−10, 10] × [10−4, 10],
with 200 points for the µ grid and 100 points for the γ grid. We set the thresh-
old function outside the grid to its value at the closest grid. The integration is
computed via Monte Carlo with 1000 draws.17 Figure 3 provides the simulation
results. There are several key characteristics, as can be seen.
First, in each case, the reservation wage is an increasing function of µ, which paral-
lels the above analysis. Naturally, a more optimistic agent (higher µ) would expect
that higher offers can be obtained, and will not accept the offer until the wage is
high enough.
Second, the reservation wage is increasing in γ for given µ of relatively small val-
ues, though it is decreasing in γ for given µ of relatively large values. Intuitively,
although a pessimistic worker (low µ) expects to obtain low wage offers on aver-
age, part of the downside risks are chopped off since a compensation c˜0 is obtained
when the offer is turned down. In this case, a higher level of uncertainty (higher γ)
provides a better chance to ”try the fortune” for a good offer, boosting up the reser-
vation wage. For an optimistic (high µ) but risk-averse worker, the insurance out
of compensation loses power. Facing a higher level of uncertainty, the worker has
an incentive to enter the labor market at an earlier stage so as to avoid downside
risks. As a result, the reservation wage goes down.
17 Changing the number of Monte Carlo samples, the grid range and grid density produce al-
most the same results.
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FIGURE 3. The reservation wage
5.3. Firm Entry. Consider a firm entry problem in the style of Fajgelbaum et al.
(2015). Each period, an investment cost ft > 0 is observed, where { ft} IID∼ h with
finite mean. The firm then decides whether to incur this cost and enter the market
to win a stochastic dividend xt via production, or wait and reconsider next period.
The firm aims to find a decision rule that maximizes the net returns.
The dividend follows xt = ξt + εxt , {εxt } IID∼ N(0,γx), where ξt and εxt are re-
spectively a persistent and a transient component, and ξt = ρξt−1 + ε
ξ
t , {εξt} IID∼
N(0,γξ). A public signal yt+1 is released at the end of each period t, where yt =
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ξt + ε
y
t ,
{
ε
y
t
} IID∼ N(0,γy). The firm has prior belief ξ ∼ N(µ,γ) that is Bayesian
updated after observing y′, so the posterior satisfies ξ|y′ ∼ N(µ′,γ′), with
γ′ =
[
1/γ+ ρ2/(γξ + γy)
]−1
and µ′ = γ′
[
µ/γ+ ρy′/(γξ + γy)
]
. (19)
The firm has utility u(x) = (1− e−ax) /a, where a > 0 is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. The value function satisfies
v∗( f , µ,γ) = max
{
E µ,γ[u(x)]− f , β
∫
v∗( f ′, µ′,γ′)p( f ′, y′|µ,γ)d( f ′, y′)
}
,
where p( f ′, y′|µ,γ) = h( f ′)l(y′|µ,γ) with l(y′|µ,γ) = N(ρµ, ρ2γ+ γξ + γy). The
exit payoff is r( f , µ,γ) := E µ,γ[u(x)]− f =
(
1− e−aµ+a2(γ+γx)/2
)
/a− f . This is a
threshold state problem, with threshold state x := f ∈ R++ =: X and environment
y := (µ,γ) ∈ R×R++ =: Y. The Jovanovic operator is
Qψ(µ,γ) = β
∫
max
{
E µ′,γ′ [u(x′)]− f ′,ψ(µ′,γ′)
}
p( f ′, y′|µ,γ)d( f ′, y′). (20)
Let n := 1, g(µ,γ) := e−µ+a2γ/2, m := 1 and d := 0. Define ` according to (11). We
use f¯ : Y → R to denote the reservation cost.
Proposition 5.2. The following statements are true:
1. Q is a contraction mapping on (b`Y, ‖ · ‖`) with unique fixed point ψ∗.
2. The value function v∗( f , µ,γ) = r( f , µ,γ)∨ψ∗(µ,γ), reservation cost f¯ (µ,γ) =
E µ,γ[u(x)]− ψ∗(µ,γ) and optimal policy σ∗( f , µ,γ) = 1{ f ≤ f¯ (µ,γ)} for all
( f , µ,γ) ∈ Z.
3. ψ∗, v∗ and f¯ are continuous functions.
4. v∗ is decreasing in f , and, if ρ ≥ 0, then ψ∗ and v∗ are increasing in µ.
Remark 5.1. Notably, the first three claims of proposition 5.2 have no restriction
on the range of ρ values, the autoregression coefficient of {ξt}.
In simulation, we set β = 0.95, a = 0.2, γx = 0.1, γy = 0.05, and h = LN(0, 0.01).
Consider ρ = 1, γξ = 0, and let the grid points of (µ,γ) lie in [−2, 10]× [10−4, 10]
with 200 points for the µ grid and 100 points for the γ grid. The reservation cost
function outside of the grid points is set to its value at the closest grid point. The
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FIGURE 4. The perceived probability of investment
integration in the operator is computed via Monte Carlo with 1000 draws.18 We
plot the perceived probability of investment, i.e., P
{
f ≤ f¯ (µ,γ)}.
As shown in figure 4, the perceived probability of investment is increasing in µ and
decreasing in γ. This parallels propositions 1 and 2 of Fajgelbaum et al. (2015). In-
tuitively, for given investment cost f and variance γ, a more optimistic firm (higher
µ) is more likely to invest. Furthermore, higher γ implies a higher level of uncer-
tainty, thus a higher risk of low returns. As a result, the risk averse firm prefers to
delay investment (gather more information to avoid downside risks), and will not
enter the market unless the cost of investment is low enough.
5.4. Job Search IV. We consider another extension of McCall (1970). The setup is
as in example 2.2, except that the state process follows
wt = ηt + θtξt (21)
ln θt = ρ ln θt−1 + ln ut (22)
18 Changing the number of Monte Carlo samples, the grid range and grid density produces
almost the same results.
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where ρ ∈ [−1, 1], {ξt} IID∼ h and {ηt} IID∼ v with finite first moments, and
{ut} IID∼ LN(0,γu). Moreover, {ξt}, {ηt} and {ut} are independent, and {θt} is
independent of {ξt} and {ηt}. Similar settings as (21)–(22) appear in many search-
theoretic and real options studies (see e.g., Gomes et al. (2001), Low et al. (2010),
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), Bagger et al. (2014), Kellogg (2014)).
We set h = LN(0,γξ) and v = LN(µη,γη). In this case, θt and ξt are persistent and
transitory components of income, respectively, and ut is treated as a shock to the
persistent component. ηt can be interpreted as social security, gifts, etc. Recall that
the utility of the agent is defined by (5), c˜0 > 0 is the unemployment compensation
and c0 := u(c˜0). The value function of the agent satisfies
v∗(w, θ) = max
{
u(w)
1− β , c0 + β
∫
v∗(w′, θ′) f (θ′|θ)h(ξ ′)v(η′)d(θ′, ξ ′, η′)
}
,
where w′ = η′+ θ′ξ ′ and f (θ′|θ) = LN(ρ ln θ,γu) is the density kernel of {θt}. The
Jovanovic operator is
Qψ(θ) = c0 + β
∫
max
{
u(w′)
1− β ,ψ(θ
′)
}
f (θ′|θ)h(ξ ′)v(η′)d(θ′, ξ ′, η′).
This is another threshold state problem, with threshold state x := w ∈ R++ =: X
and environment y := θ ∈ R++ =: Y. Let w¯ be the reservation wage. Recall the
relative risk aversion coefficient δ in (5) and the weight function ` defined by (11).
5.4.1. Case I: δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1. For ρ ∈ (−1, 1), choose n ∈ N0 such that βeρ2nσ < 1,
where σ := (1− δ)2γu. Let g(θ) := θ(1−δ)ρn + θ−(1−δ)ρn and m := d := eρ2nσ.
Proposition 5.3. If ρ ∈ (−1, 1), then the following statements hold:
1. Q is a contraction mapping on (b`Y, ‖ · ‖`) with unique fixed point ψ∗.
2. The value function v∗(w, θ) = w1−δ
(1−β)(1−δ) ∨ ψ∗(θ), reservation wage w¯(θ) =
[(1− β)(1− δ)ψ∗(θ)] 11−δ , and optimal policy σ∗(w, θ) = 1{w ≥ w¯(θ)} for all
(w, θ) ∈ Z.
3. ψ∗ and w¯ are continuously differentiable, and v∗ is continuous.
4. v∗ is increasing in w, and, if ρ ≥ 0, then ψ∗, v∗ and w¯ are increasing in θ.
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Remark 5.2. If βe(1−δ)2γu/2 < 1, then claims 1–3 of proposition 5.3 remain true for
|ρ| = 1, and claim 4 remains true for ρ = 1.
5.4.2. Case II: δ = 1. For ρ ∈ (−1, 1), choose n ∈ N0 such that βeρ2nγu < 1. Let
g(θ) := θρ
n
+ θ−ρn and m := d := eρ2nγu .
Proposition 5.4. If ρ ∈ (−1, 1), then the following statements hold:
1. Q is a contraction mapping on (b`Y, ‖ · ‖`) with unique fixed point is ψ∗.
2. The value function v∗(w, θ) = ln w1−β ∨ψ∗(θ), reservation wage w¯(θ) = e(1−β)ψ
∗(θ),
and optimal policy σ∗(w, θ) = 1{w ≥ w¯(θ)} for all (w, θ) ∈ Z.
3. ψ∗ and w¯ are continuously differentiable, and v∗ is continuous.
4. v∗ is increasing in w, and, if ρ ≥ 0, then ψ∗, v∗ and w¯ are increasing in θ.
Remark 5.3. If βeγu/2 < 1, then claims 1–3 of proposition 5.4 remain true for |ρ| =
1, and claim 4 remains true for ρ = 1.
We choose β = 0.95 and c˜0 = 0.6 as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) (section 6.6).
Further, µη = 0, γη = 10−6, γξ = 5× 10−4, γu = 10−4 and δ = 2.5. We consider
parametric class problems with respect to ρ, where ρ ∈ [0, 1] and ρ ∈ [−1, 0] are
treated separately, with 100 grid points in each case. Moreover, the grid points of
θ lie in [10−4, 10] with 200 points, and the grid is scaled to be more dense when θ
is smaller. The reservation wage outside the grid points is set to its value at the
closest grid, and the integration is computed via Monte Carlo with 1000 draws.
When ρ = 0, the state process {θt}t≥0 is independent and identically distributed,
in which case each realized persistent component will be forgotten in future stages.
As a result, the continuation value is independent of θ, yielding a reservation wage
that is horizontal to the θ-axis, as shown in figure 5.
When ρ > 0, the reservation wage is increasing in θ, which parallels propositions
5.3–5.4. Naturally, a higher θ puts the agent in a better situation, raising his desired
wage level. Moreover, since ρ measures the degree of income persistence, a higher
ρ prolongs the recovery from bad states (i.e., θ < 1), and hinders the attenuation
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FIGURE 5. The reservation wage
of good states (i.e., θ > 1). As a result, the reservation wage tends to be decreasing
in ρ when θ < 1 and increasing in ρ when θ > 1.
When ρ < 0, the agent always has chance to arrive at a good state in future stages.
In this case, a very bad or a very good current state is favorable since a very bad
state tends to evolve into a very good one next period, and a very good state tends
to show up again in two periods. If the current state is at a medium level (e.g.,
θ is close to 1), however, the agent cannot take advantage of the countercyclical
patterns. Hence, the reservation wage is decreasing in θ at the beginning and then
starts to be increasing in θ after some point.
6. EXTENSIONS
6.1. Repeated Sequential Decisions. In many economic models, the choice to
stop is not permanent. For example, when a worker accepts a job offer, the re-
sulting job might only be temporary (see, e.g., Rendon (2006), Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2008), Poschke (2010), Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), Lise (2013),
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), Bagger et al. (2014)). Another example is sov-
ereign default (see, e.g., Choi et al. (2003), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004),
Arellano (2008), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012),
Bai and Zhang (2012), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), Mendoza and Yue (2012),
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Hatchondo et al. (2016)), where default on international debt leads to a period of
exclusion from international financial markets. The exclusion is not permanent,
however. With positive probability, the country exits autarky and begins borrow-
ing from international markets again.
To put this type of problem in a general setting, suppose that, at date t, an agent
is either active or passive. When active, the agent observes Zt and chooses whether
to continue or exit. Continuation results in a current payoff c(Zt) and the agent
remains active at t + 1. Exit results in a current payoff s(Zt) and transition to the
passive state. From there the agent has no action available, but will return to the
active state at t + 1 and all subsequent period with probability α.
Assumption 6.1. There exist a Z -measurable function g : Z → R+ and constants
n ∈ N0, m, d ∈ R+ such that βm < 1, and, for all z ∈ Z,
(1) max
{∫ |s(z′)|Pn(z, dz′), ∫ |c(z′)|Pn(z, dz′)} ≤ g(z);
(2)
∫
g(z′)P(z, dz′) ≤ mg(z) + d.
Let v∗(z) and r∗(z) be the maximal discounted value starting at z ∈ Z in the active
and passive state respectively. One can show that, under assumption 6.1, v∗ and r∗
satisfy19
v∗(z) = max
{
r∗(z), c(z) + β
∫
v∗(z′)P(z, dz′)
}
(23)
and
r∗(z) = s(z) + αβ
∫
v∗(z′)P(z, dz′) + (1− α)β
∫
r∗(z′)P(z, dz′). (24)
With ψ∗ := c + βPv∗ we can write v∗ = r∗ ∨ ψ∗. Using this notation, we can view
ψ∗ and r∗ as solutions to the functional equations
ψ = c + βP(r ∨ ψ) and r = s + αβP(r ∨ ψ) + (1− α)βPr. (25)
Choose m′, d′ > 0 such that m + 2m′ > 1, β(m + 2m′) < 1 and d′ ≥ dm+2m′−1 .
Consider the weight function κ : Z→ R+ defined by
κ(z) := m′
n−1
∑
t=0
E z [|s(Zt)|+ |c(Zt)|] + g(z) + d′ (26)
19 A formal proof of this statement is available from the authors upon request.
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and the product space (bκZ× bκZ, ρκ), where ρκ is a metric on bκZ× bκZ defined by
ρκ((ψ, r), (ψ′, r′)) = ‖ψ− ψ′‖κ ∨ ‖r− r′‖κ.
With this metric, (bκZ × bκZ, ρκ) inherits the completeness of (bκZ, ‖ · ‖κ). Now
define the operator L on bκZ× bκZ by
L
(
ψ
r
)
=
(
c + βP(r ∨ ψ)
s + αβP(r ∨ ψ) + (1− α)βPr
)
.
Theorem 6.1. Under assumption 6.1, the following statements hold:
1. L is a contraction mapping on (bκZ× bκZ, ρκ) with modulus β(m + 2m′).
2. The unique fixed point of L in bκZ× bκZ is h∗ := (ψ∗, r∗).
6.2. Sequential DecisionwithMore Choices. In many economic problems, agents
face multiple choices in the sequential decision process (see, e.g., Crawford and
Shum (2005), Cooper et al. (2007), Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009), Low
et al. (2010), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013)). A standard example is on-the-job
search, where an employee can choose from quitting the job market and taking the
unemployment compensation, staying in the current job at a flow wage, or search-
ing for a new job (see, e.g., Jovanovic (1987), Bull and Jovanovic (1988), Gomes
et al. (2001)). A common characteristic of this type of problem is that different
choices lead to different transition probabilities.
To treat this type of problem generally, suppose that in period t, the agent observes
Zt and makes choices among N alternatives. A selection of alternative i results in
a current payoff ri(Zt) along with a stochastic kernel Pi. We assume the following.
Assumption 6.2. There exist a Z -measurable function g : Z → R+ and constants
m, d ∈ R+ such that βm < 1, and, for all z ∈ Z and i, j = 1, ..., N,
(1)
∫ |ri(z′)|Pj(z, dz′) ≤ g(z),
(2)
∫
g(z′)Pi(z, dz′) ≤ mg(z) + d.
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Let v∗ be the value function and ψ∗i be the expected value of choosing alternative
i. Under assumption 6.2, we can show that v∗ and (ψ∗i )
N
i=1 satisfy
20
v∗(z) = max{ψ∗1(z), ...,ψ∗N(z)}, (27)
where
ψ∗i (z) = ri(z) + β
∫
v∗(z′)Pi(z, dz′), (28)
for i = 1, ..., N. (27)–(28) imply that ψ∗i can be written as
ψ∗i (z) = ri(z) + β
∫
max{ψ∗1(z′), ...,ψ∗N(z′)}Pi(z, dz′). (29)
for i = 1, ..., N. Define the continuation value function ψ∗ := (ψ∗1 , ...,ψ
∗
N).
Choose m′, d′ ∈ R++ such that β(Nm′ + m) < 1 and d′ ≥ dNm′+m−1 . Consider the
weight function k : Z→ R+ defined by
k(z) := m′
N
∑
i=1
|ri(z)|+ g(z) + d′. (30)
One can show that the product space
(×Ni=1(bkZ), ρk) is a complete metric space,
where ρk is defined by ρk(ψ, ψ˜) = ∨Ni=1‖ψi − ψ˜i‖k for all ψ = (ψ1, ...,ψN), ψ˜ =
(ψ˜1, ..., ψ˜N) ∈ ×Ni=1(bkZ). The Jovanovic operator on
(×Ni=1(bkZ), ρk) is defined by
Qψ = Q

ψ1
...
ψN
 =

r1 + βP1(ψ1 ∨ ...∨ ψN)
......
rN + βPN(ψ1 ∨ ...∨ ψN)
 . (31)
The next result is a simple extension of theorem 6.1 and we omit its proof.
Theorem 6.2. Under assumption 6.2, the following statements hold:
1. Q is a contraction mapping on
(×Ni=1(bkZ), ρk) of modulus β(Nm′ + m).
2. The unique fixed point of Q in
(×Ni=1(bkZ), ρk) is ψ∗ = (ψ∗1 , ...,ψ∗N).
Example 6.1. Consider the on-the-job search model of Bull and Jovanovic (1988).
Each period, an employee has three choices: quit the job market, stay in the current
job, or search for a new job. Let c0 be the value of leisure and θ be the worker’s
20 A formal proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
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productivity at a given firm, with (θt)t≥0
IID∼ G(θ). Let p be the current price. The
price sequence (pt)t≥0 is Markov with transition probability F(p′|p) and stationary
distribution F∗(p). It is assumed that there is no aggregate shock so that F∗ is the
distribution of prices over firms. The current wage of the worker is pθ. The value
function satisfies v∗ = ψ∗1 ∨ ψ∗2 ∨ ψ∗3 , where
ψ∗1(p, θ) := c0 + β
∫
v∗(p′, θ′)dF∗(p′)dG(θ′)
denotes the expected value of quitting the job,
ψ∗2(p, θ) := pθ + β
∫
v∗(p′, θ)dF(p′|p)
is the expected value of staying in the current firm, and,
ψ∗3(p, θ) := pθ + β
∫
v∗(p′, θ′)dF∗(p′)dG(θ′)
represents the expected value of searching for a new job. Bull and Jovanovic (1988)
assumes that there are compact supports [θ, θ¯] and [p, p¯] for the state processes
(θt)t≥0 and (pt)t≥0, where 0 < θ < θ¯ < ∞ and 0 < p < p¯ < ∞. This assumption
can be relaxed based on our theory. Let the state space be Z := R2+. Let µp :=∫
p dF∗(p) and µθ :=
∫
θ dG(θ).
Assumption 6.3. There exist a Borel measurable map g˜ : R+ → R+, and constants
m˜, d˜ ∈ R+ such that βm˜ < 1, and, for all p ∈ R+,
(1)
∫
p′ dF(p′|p) ≤ g˜(p),
(2)
∫
g˜(p′)dF(p′|p) ≤ m˜g˜(p) + d˜,
(3) µp, µθ < ∞ and µg˜ :=
∫
g˜(p)dF∗(p) < ∞.
Let m˜ > 1 and m˜′ ≥ d/(m˜ − 1), then assumption 6.2 holds by letting g(p, θ) :=
θ(g˜(p) + m˜′), m := m˜ and d := µθ(µg˜ + m′). By theorem 6.2, Q is a contraction
mapping on
(×3i=1b`Z, ρ`). Obviously, assumption 6.3 is weaker than the assump-
tion of compact supports.
45
7. CONCLUSION
A comprehensive theory of optimal timing of decisions was developed here. The
theory successfully addresses a wide range of unbounded sequential decision prob-
lems that are hard to deal with via existing unbounded dynamic programming
theory, including both the traditional weighted supremum norm theory and the lo-
cal contraction theory. Moreover, this theory characterizes the continuation value
function directly, and has obvious advantages over the traditional dynamic pro-
gramming theory based on the value function and Bellman operator. First, since
continuation value functions are typically smoother than value functions, this the-
ory allows for shaper analysis of the optimal policies and more efficient compu-
tation. Second, when there is conditional independence along the transition path
(e.g., the class of threshold state problems), this theory mitigates the curse of di-
mensionality, a key stumbling block for numerical dynamic programming.
APPENDIX A
Lemma 7.1. Under assumption 2.1, there exist a1, a2 ∈ R+ such that for all z ∈ Z,
(1) |v∗(z)| ≤ ∑n−1t=0 βtE z[|r(Zt)|+ |c(Zt)|] + a1g(z) + a2.
(2) |ψ∗(z)| ≤ ∑n−1t=1 βtE z|r(Zt)|+∑n−1t=0 βtE z|c(Zt)|+ a1g(z) + a2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume m 6= 1. By assumption 2.1, we have
E z|r(Zn)| ≤ g(z),E z|c(Zn)| ≤ g(z) andE zg(Z1) ≤ mg(z)+ d for all z ∈ Z. For all
t ≥ 1, by the Markov property (see, e.g., Meyn and Tweedie (2012), section 3.4.3),
E zg(Zt) = E z [E z (g(Zt)|Ft−1)] = E z
(
E Zt−1 g(Z1)
)
≤ E z (mg(Zt−1) + d) = mE zg(Zt−1) + d.
Induction shows that for all t ≥ 0,
E zg(Zt) ≤ mtg(z) + 1−m
t
1−m d. (32)
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Moreover, for all t ≥ n, apply the Markov property again shows that
E z|r(Zt)| = E z [E z (|r(Zt)||Ft−n)] = E z
(
E Zt−n |r(Zn)|
) ≤ E zg(Zt−n).
Based on (32) we know that
E z|r(Zt)| ≤ mt−ng(z) + 1−m
t−n
1−m d. (33)
Similarly, for all t ≥ n, we have
E z|c(Zt)| ≤ E zg(Zt−n) ≤ mt−ng(z) + 1−m
t−n
1−m d. (34)
Based on (32) - (34), we can show that
S(z) := ∑
t≥1
βtE z [|r(Zt)|+ |c(Zt)|]
≤
n−1
∑
t=1
βtE z[|r(Zt)|+ |c(Zt)|] + 2β
n
1− βm g(z) +
2βn+1d
(1− βm)(1− β) . (35)
Since |v∗| ≤ |r|+ |c|+ S and |ψ∗| ≤ |c|+ S, the two claims hold by letting a1 :=
2βn
1−βm and a2 :=
2βn+1d
(1−βm)(1−β) . This concludes the proof. 
Denote (X,X ) as a measurable space and (Y,Y , u) as a measure space.
Lemma 7.2. Let p : Y × X → R be a measurable map that is continuous in x. If there
exists a measurable map q : Y×X → R+ that is continuous in x with q(y, x) ≥ |p(y, x)|
for all (y, x) ∈ Y × X, and that x 7→ ∫ q(y, x)u(dy) is continuous, then the mapping
x 7→ ∫ p(y, x)u(dy) is continuous.
Proof. Since q(y, x) ≥ |p(y, x)| for all (y, x) ∈ Y × X, we know that (y, x) 7→
q(y, x) ± p(y, x) are nonnegative measurable functions. Let (xn) be a sequence
of X with xn → x. By Fatou’s lemma, we have∫
lim inf
n→∞ [q(y, xn)± p(y, xn)]u(dy) ≤ lim infn→∞
∫
[q(y, xn)± p(y, xn)]u(dy).
From the given assumptions we know that lim
n→∞
∫
q(y, xn)u(dy) = q(y, x). Com-
bine this result with the above inequality, we have
±
∫
p(y, x)u(dy) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
±
∫
p(y, xn)u(dy)
)
,
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where we have used the fact that for any two given sequences (an)n≥0 and (bn)n≥0
of Rwith lim
n→∞an exists, we have: lim infn→∞ (an + bn) = lim infn→∞ an + lim infn→∞ bn. So
lim sup
n→∞
∫
p(y, xn)u(dy) ≤
∫
p(y, x)u(dy) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
∫
p(y, xn)u(dy).
Therefore, the mapping x 7→ ∫ p(y, x)u(dy) is continuous. 
APPENDIX B : MAIN PROOFS
7.1. Proof of Section 2 Results. In this section, we prove examples 2.2–2.3. Note
that in example 2.2, P has a density representation f (z′|z) = N(ρz + b, σ2).
Proof of example 2.2. Case I: δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1. In this case, the exit payoff is r(z) :=
e(1−δ)z/((1− β)(1− δ)). Since ∫ e(1−δ)z′ f (z′|z)dz′ = a1eρ(1−δ)z for some constant
a1 > 0, induction shows that∫
e(1−δ)z
′
Pt(z, dz′) = ateρ
t(1−δ)z ≤ at
(
eρ
t(1−δ)z + eρ
t(δ−1)z
)
(36)
for some constant at > 0 and all t ∈ N. Recall the definition of ξ in example 2.2.
Let n ∈ N such that βe|ρn|ξ < 1, g(z) := eρn(1−δ)z + eρn(δ−1)z and m := d := e|ρn|ξ .
By remark 2.1, it remains to show that g satisfies the geometric drift condition (3).
Let ξ1 := (1− δ)b and ξ2 := (1− δ)2σ2/2, then ξ1 + ξ2 ≤ ξ, and we have21∫
g(z′) f (z′|z)dz′ = eρn+1(1−δ)zeρnξ1+ρ2nξ2 + eρn+1(δ−1)ze−ρnξ1+ρ2nξ2
≤
(
eρ
n+1(1−δ)z + eρ
n+1(δ−1)z
)
e|ρ
n|ξ
≤
(
eρ
n(1−δ)z + eρ
n(δ−1)z + 1
)
e|ρ
n|ξ = mg(z) + d. (37)
Since βm = βe|ρn|ξ < 1, g satisfies the geometric drift property, and assumption 2.1
holds.
21 To obtain the second inequality of (37), note that either ρn+1(1− δ)z ≤ 0 or ρn+1(δ− 1)z ≤ 0.
Assume without loss of generality that the former holds, then eρ
n+1(1−δ)z ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ρn+1(δ −
1)z ≤ ρn(δ− 1)z ∨ ρn(1− δ)z. The latter implies that eρn+1(δ−1)z ≤ eρn(1−δ)z + eρn(δ−1)z. Combine
this with eρ
n+1(1−δ)z ≤ 1 yields the second inequality of (37).
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Remark 7.1. In fact, if ρ ∈ [0, 1), by (36), we can also let g(z) := eρn(1−δ)z, then∫
g(z′) f (z′|z)dz′ = eρn+1(1−δ)zeρnξ1+ρ2nξ2 ≤
(
eρ
n(1−δ)z + 1
)
eρ
n(ξ1+ξ2)
≤
(
eρ
n(1−δ)z + 1
)
eρ
nξ = mg(z) + d. (38)
In this way, we have a simpler g with geometric drift property.
Remark 7.2. If ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and βeξ < 1, by (36)–(37) one can show that assumption
2.1 holds with n := 0, g(z) := e(1−δ)z + e(δ−1)z and m := d := eξ . In fact, if ρ ∈ [0, 1]
and βeξ1+ξ2 < 1, by (38) one can show that assumption 2.1 holds with n := 0,
g(z) := e(1−δ)z and m := d := eξ1+ξ2 . In this way, we can treat nonstationary state
process at the cost of some additional restrictions on parameter values.
Case II: δ = 1. In this case, the exit payoff is r(z) = z/(1− β). Let n := 0, g(z) :=
|z|, m := |ρ| and d := σ+ |b|. Since (εt)t≥0 IID∼ N(0, σ2), by Jensen’s inequality,∫
g(z′) f (z′|z)dz′ = E z|Z1| ≤ |ρ||z|+ |b|+E |ε1|
≤ |ρ||z|+ |b|+
√
E (ε21) = |ρ||z|+ |b|+ σ = mg(z) + d.
Since βm = β|ρ| < 1, assumption 2.1 holds. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of example 2.3. Case I: δ ≥ 0 and δ 6= 1. Recall the definition of g. We have∫
w′1−δ f (w′|µ,γ)dw′ = e(1−δ)2γε/2 · e(1−δ)µ+(1−δ)2γ/2 = e(1−δ)2γε/2g(µ,γ). (39)
By remark 2.1, it remains to verify the geometric drift condition (3). This follows
from (7)–(8). Indeed, one can show that
E µ,γg(µ′,γ′) :=
∫
g(µ′,γ′) f (w′|µ,γ)dw′ = g(µ,γ) (40)
Case II: δ = 1. Since | ln a| ≤ a + 1/a, ∀a > 0, we have: |u(w′)| ≤ w′ + w′−1, and∫
|u(w′)| f (w′|µ,γ)dw′ ≤ eµ+(γ+γε)/2 + e−µ+(γ+γε)/2 = eγεg(µ,γ). (41)
Similarly as case I, one can show that E µ,γg(µ′,γ′) = g(µ,γ).
Hence, assumption 2.1 holds in both cases. This concludes the proof. 
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Proof of theorem 2.1. To prove claim 1, based on the weighted contraction mapping
theorem (see, e.g., Boyd (1990), section 3), it suffices to verify: (a) Q is monotone,
i.e., Qψ ≤ Qφ if ψ, φ ∈ b`Z and ψ ≤ φ; (b) Q0 ∈ b`Z and Qψ is Z -measurable for
all ψ ∈ b`Z; and (c) Q(ψ+ a`) ≤ Qψ+ aβ(m + 2m′)` for all a ∈ R+ and ψ ∈ b`Z.
Obviously, condition (a) holds. By (10)–(11), we have
|(Q0)(z)|
`(z)
≤ |c(z)|
`(z)
+ β
∫ |r(z′)|
`(z)
P(z, dz′) ≤ (1+ β)/m′ < ∞
for all z ∈ Z, so ‖Q0‖` < ∞. The measurability of Qψ follows immediately from
our primitive assumptions. Hence, condition (b) holds. By the Markov property
(see, e.g., Meyn and Tweedie (2012), section 3.4.3), we have∫
E z′ |r(Zt)|P(z, dz′) = E z|r(Zt+1)| and
∫
E z′ |c(Zt)|P(z, dz′) = E z|c(Zt+1)|.
Let h(z) := ∑n−1t=1 E z|r(Zt)|+∑n−1t=0 E z|c(Zt)|, then we have∫
h(z′)P(z, dz′) =
n
∑
t=2
E z|r(Zt)|+
n
∑
t=1
E z|c(Zt)|. (42)
By the assumptions on m′ and d′, we have m + 2m′ > 1 and (d + d′)/(m + 2m′) ≤
d′. Assumption 2.1 and (42) then imply that
∫
`(z′)P(z, dz′) = m′
(
n
∑
t=2
E z|r(Zt)|+
n
∑
t=1
E z|c(Zt)|
)
+
∫
g(z′)P(z, dz′) + d′
≤ m′
(
n−1
∑
t=2
E z|r(Zt)|+
n−1
∑
t=1
E z|c(Zt)|
)
+ (m + 2m′)g(z) + d + d′
≤ (m + 2m′)
(
m′
m + 2m′
h(z) + g(z) +
d + d′
m + 2m′
)
≤ (m + 2m′)`(z).
Hence, for all ψ ∈ b`Z, a ∈ R+ and z ∈ Z, we have
Q(ψ+ a`)(z) = c(z) + β
∫
max
{
r(z′),ψ(z′) + a`(z′)
}
P(z, dz′)
≤ c(z) + β
∫
max
{
r(z′),ψ(z′)
}
P(z, dz′) + aβ
∫
`(z′)P(z, dz′)
≤ Qψ(z) + aβ(m + 2m′)`(z).
So condition (c) holds. Claim 1 is verified.
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Regarding claim 2, substituting v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗ into (9) we get
ψ∗(z) = c(z) + β
∫
max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}P(z, dz′).
This implies that ψ∗ is a fixed point of Q. Moreover, from lemma 7.1 we know that
ψ∗ ∈ b`Z. Hence, ψ∗ must coincide with the unique fixed point of Q under b`Z.
Finally, by theorem 1.11 of Peskir and Shiryaev (2006), we can show that τ˜ :=
inf{t ≥ 0 : v∗(Zt) = r(Zt)} is an optimal stopping time. Claim 3 then follows from
the definition of the optimal policy and the fact that v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗. 
7.2. Proof of Section 3 Results.
Proof of proposition 3.1. Let b`cZ be the set of continuous functions in b`Z. Since ` is
continuous by assumption, b`cZ is a closed subset of b`Z (see e.g., Boyd (1990), sec-
tion 3). To show the continuity of ψ∗, it suffices to verify that Q(b`cZ) ⊂ b`cZ (see,
e.g., Stokey et al. (1989), corollary 1 of theorem 3.2). For all ψ ∈ b`cZ, there exists a
constant G ∈ R+ such that |max{r(z),ψ(z)}| ≤ |r(z)|+ G`(z). In particular,
z 7→ |r(z)|+ G`(z)±max{r(z),ψ(z)}
are nonnegative and continuous. Let h(z) := max{r(z),ψ(z)}. Based on the gen-
eralized Fatou’s lemma of Feinberg et al. (2014) (theorem 1.1), we can show that
for all sequence (zm)m≥0 of Z such that zm → z ∈ Z, we have∫ (|r(z′)|+ G`(z′)± h(z′)) P(z, dz′) ≤ lim inf
m→∞
∫ (|r(z′)|+ G`(z′)± h(z′)) P(zm, dz′).
Since assumptions 3.2–3.3 imply that
lim
m→∞
∫ (|r(z′)|+ G`(z′)) P(zm, dz′) = ∫ (|r(z′)|+ G`(z′)) P(z, dz′),
we have
±
∫
h(z′)P(z, dz′) ≤ lim inf
m→∞
(
±
∫
h(z′)P(zm, dz′)
)
,
where we have used the fact that for given sequences (am)m≥0 and (bm)m≥0 of R
with lim
m→∞am exists, we have: lim infm→∞ (am + bm) = limm→∞am + lim infm→∞ bm. Hence,
lim sup
m→∞
∫
h(z′)P(zm, dz′) ≤
∫
h(z′)P(z, dz′) ≤ lim inf
m→∞
∫
h(z′)P(zm, dz′), (43)
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i.e., z 7→ ∫ h(z′)P(z, dz′) is continuous. Since c is continuous by assumption, Qψ ∈
b`cZ. Hence, Q(b`cZ) ⊂ b`cZ and ψ∗ is continuous. The continuity of v∗ follows
from the continuity of ψ∗ and r and the fact that v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗. 
Recall µ and µi defined in the beginning of section 3.3. The next lemma holds.
Lemma 7.3. Suppose assumption 2.1 holds, and, for i = 1, ..., m and j = 1, 2
(1) P has a density representation f such that Di f (z′|z) exists, ∀(z, z′) ∈ int(Z)× Z.
(2) For all z0 ∈ int(Z), there exists δ > 0, such that∫
|k j(z′)| sup
zi∈B¯δ(zi0)
∣∣Di f (z′|z)∣∣dz′ < ∞ (z−i = z−i0 ).
Then: Diµ(z) = µi(z) for all z ∈ int(Z) and i = 1, ..., m.
Proof of lemma 7.3. For all z0 ∈ int(Z), let {zn} be an arbitrary sequence of int(Z)
such that zin → zi0, zin 6= zi0 and z−in = z−i0 for all n ∈ N. For the δ > 0 given by (2),
there exists N ∈ N such that zin ∈ B¯δ(zi0) for all n ≥ N. Holding z−i = z−i0 , by the
mean value theorem, there exists ξ i(z′, zn, z0) ∈ B¯δ(zi0) such that
|4i(z′, zn, z0)| :=
∣∣∣∣∣ f (z′|zn)− f (z′|z0)zin − zi0
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Di f (z′|z)|zi=ξ i(z′,zn,z0)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
zi∈B¯δ(zi0)
∣∣Di f (z′|z)∣∣
Since in addition |ψ∗| ≤ G` for some G ∈ R+, we have: for all n ≥ N,
(a)
∣∣max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}4i(z′, zn, z0)∣∣ ≤ (|r(z′)|+ G`(z′)) sup
zi∈B¯δ(zi0)
|Di f (z′|z)|,
(b)
∫
(|r(z′)|+ G`(z′)) sup
zi∈B¯δ(zi0)
|Di f (z′|z)| dz′ < ∞, and
(c) max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}4i(z′, zn, z0)→ max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}Di f (z′|z0) as n→ ∞,
where (b) follows from condition (2). By the dominated convergence theorem,
µ(zn)− µ(z0)
zin − zi0
=
∫
max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}4i(z′, zn, z0)dz′
→
∫
max{r(z′),ψ∗(z′)}Di f (z′|z0)dz′ = µi(z0).
Hence, Diµ(z0) = µi(z0), as was to be shown. 
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7.3. Proof of Section 5 Results.
Proof of proposition 5.1. Assumption 2.1 holds due to bounded payoffs. By theorem
2.1, claim 1 holds. Let X = [wl, wh] ⊂ R+. Since c0 ∈ X, v∗(w,pi) ∈ [wl/(1 −
β), wh/(1− β)], then c0 + β
∫
v∗(w′,pi′)hpi(w′)dw′ ∈ [wl/(1− β), wh/(1− β)]. By
the intermediate value theorem, assumption 4.1 holds. By theorem 2.1 and (15),
claim 2 holds. P satisfies the Feller property by lemma 7.2. Since payoff functions
are continuous, the continuity of ψ∗ and v∗ follows from proposition 3.1 (or remark
3.1). The continuity of w¯ follows from proposition 4.1. Claim 3 is verified. 
Proof of proposition 5.2. The exit payoff satisfies∣∣r( f ′, µ′,γ′)∣∣ ≤ 1/a + (ea2γx/2/a) · e−aµ′+a2γ′/2 + f ′. (44)
Using (19), we can show that∫
e−aµ
′+a2γ′/2P(z, dz′) =
∫
e−aµ
′+a2γ′/2l(y′|µ,γ)dy′ = e−aµ+a2γ/2. (45)
Let µ f denote the mean of { ft}. Combine (44)–(45), we have∫ ∣∣r( f ′, µ′,γ′)∣∣ P(z, dz′) ≤ (1/a + µ f )+ (ea2γx/2/a) · g(µ,γ). (46)
Notice that (45) is equivalent to∫
g(µ′,γ′)P(z, dz′) = g(µ,γ). (47)
Hence, assumption 2.1 holds with n := 1, m := 1 and d := 0. The intermediate
value theorem shows that assumption 4.1 holds. By theorem 2.1 and the analysis
of section 4, claims 1–2 hold.
For all bounded continuous function f˜ : Z→ R, we have∫
f˜ (z′)P(z, dz′) =
∫
f˜ ( f ′, µ′,γ′)h( f ′)l(y′|µ,γ)d( f ′, y′).
By (19) and lemma 7.2, this function is bounded and continuous in (µ,γ). Hence,
assumption 3.1 holds. The exit payoff r is continuous. By (19), both sides of (44)
are continuous in (µ,γ). By (45)–(46), the conditional expectation of the right side
of (44) is continuous in (µ,γ). Lemma 7.2 then implies that (µ,γ) 7→ E µ,γ|r(Z1)|
is continuous. Now we have shown that assumption 3.2 holds. Assumption 3.3
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holds since g is continuous and (47) holds. Proposition 3.1 then implies that ψ∗
and v∗ are continuous. By proposition 4.1, f¯ is continuous. Claim 3 is verified.
Since r is decreasing in f , v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗ is decreasing in f . If ρ ≥ 0, then l is stochas-
tically increasing in µ. By (19), P(r ∨ ψ) is increasing in µ for all ψ ∈ b`Y that is
increasing in µ, i.e., assumption 3.5 holds. Since r is increasing in µ, by proposition
3.2, ψ∗ and v∗ are increasing in µ. Hence, claim 4 holds. 
Proof of proposition 5.3. Proof of claim 1. Since
w′1−δ =
(
η′ + θ′ξ ′
)1−δ ≤ 2 (η′1−δ + θ′1−δξ ′1−δ) , (48)
we have∫
w′1−δP(z, dz′) ≤ 2
∫
η′1−δv(η′)dη′ + 2
∫
ξ ′1−δh(ξ ′)dξ ′ ·
∫
θ′1−δ f (θ′|θ)dθ′
= 2e(1−δ)µη+(1−δ)
2γη/2 + 2e(1−δ)
2(γξ+γu)/2 · θ(1−δ)ρ. (49)
Induction shows that∫
w′1−δPt(z, dz′) ≤ a(t)1 + a(t)2 θ(1−δ)ρ
t ≤ a(t)1 + a(t)2
(
θ(1−δ)ρ
t
+ θ−(1−δ)ρ
t
)
(50)
for some a(t)1 , a
(t)
2 > 0 and all t ∈ N. Define g as in the assumption, then∫
g(θ′) f (θ′|θ)dθ′ =
(
e(1−δ)ρ
n+1 ln θ + e−(1−δ)ρ
n+1 ln θ
)
e(1−δ)
2ρ2nγu/2 (51)
≤
(
e(1−δ)ρ
n ln θ + e−(1−δ)ρ
n ln θ + 1
)
e(1−δ)
2ρ2nγu/2
≤ (g(θ) + 1) eρ2nσ = mg(θ) + d.
Hence, assumption 2.1 holds. Claim 1 then follows from theorem 2.1.
Proof of claim 2. Assumption 4.1 holds by the intermediate value theorem. Claim 2
then follows from theorem 2.1, assumption 4.1 and (15).
Proof of claim 3. Note that the stochastic kernel P has a density representation in the
sense that for all z ∈ Z and B ∈ Z ,
P(z, B) =
∫
1
{
(η′ + ξ ′θ′, θ′) ∈ B} v(η′)h(ξ ′) f (θ′|θ)d(η′, ξ ′, θ′).
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Moreover, it is straightforward (though tedious) to show that θ 7→ f (θ′|θ) is twice
differentiable for all θ′, that (θ, θ′) 7→ ∂ f (θ′|θ)/∂θ is continuous, and that
∂2 f (θ′|θ)/∂θ2 = 0 if and only if θ = θ∗(θ′) = a˜i eln θ′/ρ, i = 1, 2 (52)
where a˜1, a˜2 = exp
[
γu
ρ
(
− 12ρ ±
√
1
4ρ2 +
1
γu
)]
. If ρ > 0, then θ∗(θ′) → ∞ as θ′ → ∞
and θ∗(θ′) → 0 as θ′ → 0. If ρ < 0, then θ∗(θ′) → 0 as θ′ → ∞ and θ∗(θ′) →
∞ as θ′ → 0. Hence, assumption 3.8 holds. Based on (48)–(51) and lemma 7.2,
we can show that assumption 3.10 holds. By proposition 3.4, ψ∗ is continuously
differentiable. Since assumption 4.1 holds and r is continuously differentiable, by
proposition 4.3, w¯ is continuously differentiable. v∗ is continuous since v∗ = r∨ψ∗.
Proof of claim 4. Assumption 3.4 holds since c ≡ c0. Note that
r(w) = r(η + ξθ) = (η + ξθ)1−δ/[(1− β)(1− δ)]
is increasing in θ, and, when ρ > 0, f (θ′|θ) is stochastically increasing in θ. Hence,
assumption 3.5 holds. By propositions 3.2 and 4.2, ψ∗ and w¯ are increasing in θ.
Moreover, r is a function of w, ψ∗ is a function of θ, both functions are increasing,
and v∗ = r ∨ ψ∗. Hence, v∗ is increasing in w and θ. 
Proof of proposition 5.4. Since | ln a| ≤ 1/a + a for all a > 0, we have
|u(w′)| = | ln w′| = | ln(η′ + θ′ξ ′)| ≤ 1/η′ + η′ + θ′ξ ′.
Hence,∫
|u(w′)|P(z, dz′) ≤
∫
(1/η′ + η′)v(η′)dη′ +
∫
ξ ′h(ξ ′)dξ ′ ·
∫
θ′ f (θ′|θ)dθ′
=
(
e−µη+γη/2 + eµη+γη/2
)
+ e(γξ+γu)/2 · θρ.
Induction shows that∫
|u(w′)|Pt(z, dz′) ≤ a(t)1 + a(t)2 θρ
t ≤ a(t)1 + a(t)2
(
θρ
t
+ θ−ρ
t
)
(53)
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for some a(t)1 , a
(t)
2 > 0 and all t ∈ N. Hence, we can define g as in the assumption.
Similarly as in the proof of proposition 5.3, we can show that∫
g(θ′) f (θ′|θ)dθ′ =
(
eρ
n+1 ln θ + e−ρ
n+1 ln θ
)
eρ
2nγu/2 (54)
≤
(
eρ
n ln θ + e−ρ
n ln θ + 1
)
eρ
2nγu/2
= (g(θ) + 1) eρ
2nγu/2 ≤ mg(θ) + d.
Hence, assumption 2.1 holds. Claim 1 then follows from theorem 2.1. The remain-
ing proof is similar to proposition 5.3. 
7.4. Proof of Section 6 Results.
Proof of theorem 6.1. Regarding claim 1, similar to the proof of theorem 2.1, we can
show that ∫
κ(z′)P(z, dz′) ≤ (m + 2m′)κ(z)
for all z ∈ Z. We next show that L : (bκZ× bκZ, ρκ) → (bκZ× bκZ, ρκ). For all h :=
(ψ, r) ∈ bκZ× bκZ, define the functions p(z) := c(z)+ β
∫
max{r(z′),ψ(z′)}P(z, dz′)
and q(z) := s(z)+ αβ
∫
max{r(z′),ψ(z′)}P(z, dz′)+ (1− α)β ∫ r(z′)P(z, dz′). Then
there exists G ∈ R+ such that for all z ∈ Z,
|p(z)|
κ(z)
≤ |c(z)|
κ(z)
+
βG
∫
κ(z′)P(z, dz′)
κ(z)
≤ 1
m′
+ β(m + 2m′)G < ∞
and
|q(z)|
κ(z)
≤ |s(z)|
κ(z)
+
βG
∫
κ(z′)P(z, dz′)
κ(z)
≤ 1
m′
+ β(m + 2m′)G < ∞.
This implies that p ∈ bκZ and q ∈ bκZ. Hence, Lh ∈ bκZ× bκZ. Next, we show that
L is indeed a contraction mapping on (bκZ× bκZ, ρκ). For all fixed h1 := (ψ1, r1)
and h2 := (ψ2, r2) in bκZ× bκZ, we have ρκ(Lh1, Lh2) = I ∨ J, where
I := ‖βP(r1 ∨ ψ1)− βP(r2 ∨ ψ2)‖κ
and
J := ‖αβ[P(r1 ∨ ψ1)− P(r2 ∨ ψ2)] + (1− α)β(Pr1 − Pr2)‖κ.
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For all z ∈ Z, we have∣∣∣∣∫ (r1 ∨ ψ1)(z′)P(z, dz′)− ∫ (r2 ∨ ψ2)(z′)P(z, dz′)∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
|r1 ∨ ψ1 − r2 ∨ ψ2| (z′)P(z, dz′) ≤
∫
(|ψ1 − ψ2| ∨ |r1 − r2|)(z′)P(z, dz′)
≤ (‖ψ1 − ψ2‖κ ∨ ‖r1 − r2‖κ)
∫
κ(z′)P(z, dz′) ≤ ρκ(h1, h2)(m + 2m′)κ(z),
where the second inequality is due to the elementary fact |a ∨ b− a′ ∨ b′| ≤ |a−
a′| ∨ |b − b′|. This implies that I ≤ β(m + 2m′)ρκ(h1, h2). Regarding J, similar
arguments yield J ≤ β(m + 2m′)ρκ(h1, h2). In conclusion, we have
ρκ(Lh1, Lh2) = I ∨ J ≤ β(m + 2m′)ρκ(h1, h2). (55)
Hence, L is a contraction mapping on (bκZ× bκZ, ρκ) with modulus β(m+ 2m′), as
was to be shown. Claim 1 is verified.
Since v∗ and r∗ satisfy (23)–(24), by (25), h∗ := (ψ∗, r∗) is indeed a fixed point of L.
To prove that claim 2 holds, it remains to show that h∗ ∈ bκZ× bκZ. Since
max{|r∗(z)|, |ψ∗(z)|} ≤
∞
∑
t=0
βtE z[|s(Zt)|+ g(Zt)],
this can be proved in a similar way as lemma 7.1. Hence, claim 2 is verified. 
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